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Abstract
Quantitative games are two-player zero-sum games played on directed weighted graphs. Total-
payoff games—that can be seen as a refinement of the well-studied mean-payoff games—are the
variant where the payoff of a play is computed as the sum of the weights. Our aim is to describe
the first pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for total-payoff games in the presence of arbitrary
weights. It consists of a non-trivial application of the value iteration paradigm. Indeed, it
requires to study, as a milestone, a refinement of these games, called min-cost reachability games,
where we add a reachability objective to one of the players. For these games, we give an efficient
value iteration algorithm to compute the values and optimal strategies (when they exist), that
runs in pseudo-polynomial time. We also propose heuristics to speed up the computations.
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1 Introduction
Games played on graphs are nowadays a well-studied and well-established model for the
computer-aided design of computer systems, as they enable automatic synthesis of systems
that are correct-by-construction. Of particular interest are quantitative games, that allow
one to model precisely quantitative parameters of the system, such as energy consumption.
In this setting, the game is played by two players on a directed weighted graph, where the
edge weights model, for instance, a cost or a reward associated to the moves of the players.
Each vertex of the graph belongs to one of the two players who compete by moving a token
along the graph edges, thereby forming an infinite path called a play. With each play is
associated a real-valued payoff computed from the sequence of edge weights along the play.
The traditional payoffs that have been considered in the literature include total-payoff [10],
mean-payoff [7] and discounted-payoff [17]. In this quantitative setting, one player aims at
maximising the payoff while the other tries to minimise it. So one wants to compute, for each
player, the best payoff that he can guarantee from each vertex, and the associated optimal
strategies (i.e., that guarantee the optimal payoff no matter how the adversary is playing).
Such quantitative games have been extensively studied in the literature. Their associated
decision problems (is the value of a given vertex above a given threshold?) are known to be
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2 To Reach or not to Reach? Efficient Algorithms for Total-Payoff Games
in NP ∩ co-NP. Mean-payoff games have arguably been best studied from the algorithmic
point of view. A landmark is Zwick and Paterson’s pseudo-polynomial time (i.e., polynomial
in the weighted graph when weights are encoded in unary) algorithm [17], using the value
iteration paradigm that consists in computing a sequence of vectors of values that converges
towards the optimal values of the vertices. After a fixed, pseudo-polynomial, number of steps,
the computed values are precise enough to deduce the actual values of all vertices. Better
pseudo-polynomial time algorithms have later been proposed, e.g., in [1, 4, 6], also achieving
sub-exponential expected running time by means of randomisation.
In this paper, we focus on total-payoff games. Given an infinite play pi, we denote
by pi[k] the prefix of pi of length k, and by TP(pi[k]) the (finite) sum of all edge weights
along this prefix. The total-payoff of pi, TP(pi), is the inferior limit of all those sums, i.e.,
TP(pi) = lim infk→∞TP(pi[k]). Compared to mean-payoff (and discounted-payoff) games,
the literature on total-payoff games is less extensive. Gimbert and Zielonka have shown [10]
that optimal memoryless strategies always exist for both players and the best algorithm
to compute the values runs in exponential time [9], and consists in iteratively improving
strategies. Other related works include energy games where one player tries to optimise its
energy consumption (computed again as a sum), keeping the energy level always above 0
(which makes difficult to apply techniques solving those games in the case of total-payoff);
and a probabilistic variant of total-payoff games, where the weights are restricted to be
non-negative [5]. Yet, we argue that the total-payoff objective is interesting as a refinement
of the mean-payoff. Indeed, recall first that the total-payoff is finite if and only if the
mean-payoff is null. Then, the computation of the total-payoff enables a finer, two-stage
analysis of a game G: (i) compute the mean payoff MP(G); (ii) subtract MP(G) from all
edge weights, and scale the resulting weights if necessary to obtain integers. At that point,
one has obtained a new game G′ with null mean-payoff; (iii) compute TP(G′) to quantify
the amount of fluctuation around the mean-payoff of the original game. Unfortunately, so
far, no efficient (i.e., pseudo-polynomial time) algorithms for total-payoff games have been
proposed, and straightforward adaptations of Zwick and Paterson’s value iteration algorithm
for mean-payoff do not work, as we demonstrate at the end of Section 2. In the present
article, we fill in this gap by introducing the first pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for
computing the values in total-payoff games.
Our solution is a non-trivial value iteration algorithm that proceeds through nested fixed
points (see Algorithm 2). A play of a total-payoff game is infinite by essence. We transform
the game so that one of the players (the minimiser) must ensure a reachability objective: we
assume that the game ends once this reachability objective has been met. The intuition
behind this transformation, that stems from the use of an inferior limit in the definition of the
total-payoff, is as follows: in any play pi whose total-payoff is finite, there is a position ` in the
play after which all the partial sums TP(pi[i]) (with i > `) will be larger than or equal to the
total-payoff TP(pi) of pi, and infinitely often both will be equal. For example, consider the
game depicted in Figure 1(a), where the maximiser player (henceforth called Max) plays with
the round vertices and the minimiser (Min) with the square vertices. For both players, the
optimal value when playing from v1 is 2, and the play pi = v1v2v3 v4v5 v4v3 (v4v5)ω reaches
this value (i.e., TP(pi) = 2). Moreover, for all k > 7: TP(pi[k]) > TP(pi), and infinitely
many prefixes (pi[8], pi[10], pi[12], . . .) have a total-payoff of 2, as shown in Figure 1(b).
Based on this observation, we transform a total-payoff game G, into a new game that has
the same value as the original total-payoff game but incorporates a reachability objective
for Min. Intuitively, in this new game, we allow a new action for Min: after each play prefix
pi[k], he can ask to stop the game, in which case the payoff of the play is the payoff TP(pi[k])
T.Brihaye, G. Geeraerts, A. Haddad and B.Monmege 3
v4v3 v5v2v1
−2 −1
2 12
−1 −1(a) TP(pi) = 2
0
1
2
3
TP(pi[k])
k
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
(b)
Figure 1 (a) A total-payoff game, and (b) the evolution of the partial sums in pi.
of the prefix. However, allowing Min to stop the game at any moment would not allow to
obtain the same value as in the original total-payoff game: for instance, in the example of
Figure 1(a), Min could secure value 1 by asking to stop after pi[2], which is strictly smaller
that the actual total-payoff (2) of the whole play pi. So, we allow Max to veto to stop the
game, in which case both must go on playing. Again, allowing Max to turn down all of Min’s
requests would be unfair, so we parametrise the game with a natural number K, which is
the maximal number of vetoes that Max can play (and we denote by GK the resulting game).
For the play depicted in Figure 1(b), letting K = 3 is sufficient: trying to obtain a better
payoff than the optimal, Min could request to stop after pi[0], pi[2] and pi[6], and Max can
veto these three requests. After that, Max can safely accept the next request of Min, since
the total payoff of all prefixes pi[k] with k > 6 are larger than or equal to TP(pi) = 2. Our
key technical contribution is to show that for all total-payoff games, there exists a finite,
pseudo-polynomial, value of K such that the values in GK and G coincide (assuming all
values are finite in G: we treat the +∞ and −∞ values separately). Now, assume that, when
Max accepts to stop the game (possibly because he has exhausted the maximal number K of
vetoes), the game moves to a target state, and stops. By doing so, we effectively reduce the
computation of the values in the total-payoff game G to the computation of the values in the
total-payoff game GK with an additional reachability objective (the target state) for Min.
In the following, such refined total-payoff games—where Min must reach a designated
target vertex—will be called min-cost reachability games. Failing to reach the target vertices
is the worst situation for Min, so the payoff of all plays that do not reach the target is +∞,
irrespective of the weights along the play. Otherwise, the payoff of a play is the sum of the
weights up to the first occurrence of the target. As such, this problem nicely generalises the
classical shortest path problem in a weighted graph. In the one-player setting (considering
the point of view of Min for instance), this problem can be solved in polynomial time by
Dijkstra’s and Floyd-Warshall’s algorithms when the weights are non-negative and arbitrary,
respectively. In [11], Khachiyan et al. propose an extension of Dijkstra’s algorithm to handle
the two-player, non-negative weights case. However, in our more general setting (two players,
arbitrary weights), this problem has, as far as we know, not been studied as such, except that
the associated decision problem is known to be in NP∩ co-NP [8]. A pseudo-polynomial time
algorithm to solve a very close problem, called the longest shortest path problem has been
introduced by Björklund and Vorobyov [1] to eventually solve mean-payoff games. However,
because of this peculiar context of mean-payoff games, their definition of the length of a
path differs from our definition of the payoff and their algorithm cannot be easily adapted
to solve our min-cost reachability problem. Thus, as a second contribution, we show that
a value iteration algorithm enables us to compute in pseudo-polynomial time the values of
a min-cost reachability game. We believe that min-cost reachability games bear their own
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potential theoretical and practical applications1. Those games are discussed in Section 3.
In addition to the pseudo-polynomial time algorithm to compute the values, we show how
to compute optimal strategies for both players and characterise them: there is always a
memoryless strategy for the maximiser player, but we exhibit an example (see Figure 2(a))
where the minimiser player needs (finite) memory. Those results on min-cost reachability
games are exploited in Section 4 where we introduce and prove correct our efficient algorithm
for total-payoff games.
Finally, we briefly present our implementation in Section 5, using as a core the numerical
model-checker PRISM. This allows us to describe some heuristics able to improve the practical
performances of our algorithms for total-payoff games and min-cost reachability games on
certain subclasses of graphs. More technical explanations and full proofs may be found in an
extended version of this article [2].
2 Quantitative games with arbitrary weights
We denote by Z the set of integers, and Z∞ = Z ∪ {−∞,+∞}. The set of vectors indexed
by V with values in S is denoted by SV . We let 4 be the pointwise order over ZV∞, where
x 4 y if and only if x(v) 6 y(v) for all v ∈ V .
We consider two-player turn-based games on weighted graphs and denote the two players
by Max and Min. A weighted graph is a tuple 〈V,E, ω〉 where V = VMaxunionmultiVMin is a finite set of
vertices partitioned into the sets VMax and VMin of Max and Min respectively, E ⊆ V × V is a
set of directed edges, ω : E → Z is the weight function, associating an integer weight with each
edge. In our drawings, Max vertices are depicted by circles; Min vertices by boxes. For every
vertex v ∈ V , the set of successors of v by E is denoted by E(v) = {v′ ∈ V | (v, v′) ∈ E}.
Without loss of generality, we assume that every graph is deadlock-free, i.e., for all vertices v,
E(v) 6= ∅. Finally, throughout this article, we let W = max(v,v′)∈E |ω(v, v′)| be the greatest
edge weight (in absolute value) in the game graph. A finite play is a finite sequence of vertices
pi = v0v1 · · · vk such that for all 0 6 i < k, (vi, vi+1) ∈ E. A play is an infinite sequence of
vertices pi = v0v1 · · · such that every finite prefix v0 · · · vk, denoted by pi[k], is a finite play.
The total-payoff of a finite play pi = v0v1 · · · vk is obtained by summing up the weights
along pi, i.e., TP(pi) =
∑k−1
i=0 ω(vi, vi+1). In the following, we sometimes rely on the mean-
payoff to obtain information about total-payoff objectives. The mean-payoff computes the
average weight of pi, i.e., if k > 1, MP(pi) = 1k
∑k−1
i=0 ω(vi, vi+1), and MP(pi) = 0 when
k = 0. These definitions are lifted to infinite plays as follows. The total-payoff of a play pi is
given by TP(pi) = lim infk→∞TP(pi[k]).2 Similarly, the mean-payoff of a play pi is given by
MP(pi) = lim infk→∞MP(pi[k]). A weighted graph equipped with these payoffs is called a
total-payoff game or a mean-payoff game, respectively.
A strategy for Max (respectively, Min) in a game G = 〈V,E, ω,P〉 (with P one of the
previous payoffs), is a mapping σ : V ∗VMax → V (respectively, σ : V ∗VMin → V ) such that for
all sequences pi = v0 · · · vk with vk ∈ VMax (respectively, vk ∈ VMin), (vk, σ(pi)) ∈ E. A play
or finite play pi = v0v1 · · · conforms to a strategy σ of Max (respectively, Min) if for all k
such that vk ∈ VMax (respectively, vk ∈ VMin), vk+1 = σ(pi[k]). A strategy σ is memoryless
1 An example of practical application would be to perform controller synthesis taking into account energy
consumption. On the other hand, the problem of computing the values in certain classes of priced timed
games has recently been reduced to computing the values in min-cost reachability games [3].
2 Our results can easily be extended by substituting a lim sup for the lim inf. The lim inf is more natural
since we adopt the point of view of the maximiser Max, hence the lim inf is the worst partial sum seen
infinitely often.
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if for all finite plays pi, pi′, we have σ(piv) = σ(pi′v) for all v. A strategy σ is said to be
finite-memory if it can be encoded in a deterministic Moore machine, 〈M,m0, up, dec〉, where
M is a finite set representing the memory of the strategy, with an initial memory content
m0 ∈M , up : M × V →M is a memory-update function, and dec : M × V → V a decision
function such that for every finite play pi and vertex v, σ(piv) = dec(mem(piv), v) where
mem(pi) is defined by induction on the length of the finite play pi as follows: mem(v0) = m0,
and mem(piv) = up(mem(pi), v). We say that |M | is the size of the strategy.
For all strategies σMax and σMin, for all vertices v, we let Play(v, σMax, σMin) be the
outcome of σMax and σMin, defined as the unique play conforming to σMax and σMin and
starting in v. Naturally, the objective of Max is to maximise its payoff. In this model
of zero-sum game, Min then wants to minimise the payoff of Max. Formally, we let
ValG(v, σMax) and ValG(v, σMin) be the respective values of the strategies, defined as (recall that
P is either TP or MP): ValG(v, σMax) = infσMin P(Play(v, σMax, σMin)) and ValG(v, σMin) =
supσMax P(Play(v, σMax, σMin)). Finally, for all vertices v, we let ValG(v) = supσMax ValG(v, σMax)
and ValG(v) = infσMin ValG(v, σMin) be the lower and upper values of v respectively. We may
easily show that ValG 4 ValG . We say that strategies σ∗Max of Max and σ∗Min of Min are optimal
if, for all vertices v: ValG(v, σ∗Max) = ValG(v) and ValG(v, σ∗Min) = ValG(v) respectively. We
say that a game G is determined if for all vertices v, its lower and upper values are equal. In
that case, we write ValG(v) = ValG(v) = ValG(v), and refer to it as the value of v. If the game
is clear from the context, we may drop the index G of all previous values. Mean-payoff and
total-payoff games are known to be determined, with the existence of optimal memoryless
strategies [17, 10].
Total-payoff games have been mainly considered as a refinement of mean-payoff games [10].
Indeed, if the mean-payoff value of a game is positive (respectively, negative), its total-payoff
value is necessarily +∞ (respectively, −∞). When the mean-payoff value is 0 however,
the total-payoff is necessarily different from +∞ and −∞, hence total-payoff games are
particularly useful in this case. Deciding whether the total-payoff value of a vertex is positive
can be achieved in NP ∩ co-NP. In [9], the complexity is refined to UP ∩ co-UP, and values
are shown to be effectively computable solving nested fixed point equations with a strategy
iteration algorithm working in exponential time in the worst case.
Our aim is to give a pseudo-polynomial algorithm solving total-payoff games. In many
cases, (e.g., mean-payoff games), a successful way to obtain such an efficient algorithm
is the value iteration paradigm. Intuitively, value iteration algorithms compute successive
approximations x0, x1, . . . , xi, . . . of the game value by restricting the number of turns that
the players are allowed to play: xi is the vector of optimal values achievable when the players
play at most i turns. The sequence of values is computed by means of an operator F , letting
vi+1 = F(vi) for all i. Good properties (Scott-continuity and monotonicity) of F ensure
convergence towards its smallest or greatest fixed point (depending on the value of x0), which,
in some cases, happens to be the value of the game. Let us briefly explain why such a simple
approach fails with total-payoff games. In our case, the operator F is such that F(x)(v) =
maxv′∈E(v) ω(v, v′) + x(v′) for all v ∈ VMax and F(x)(v) = minv′∈E(v) ω(v, v′) + x(v′) for all
v ∈ VMin. This definition matches the intuition that xi are optimal values after i turns.
Then, consider the example of Figure 1(a), limited to vertices {v3, v4, v5} for simplicity.
Observe that there are two simple cycles with weight 0, hence the total-payoff value of
this game is finite. Max has the choice between cycling into one of these two cycles. It
is easy to check that Max’s optimal choice is to enforce the cycle between v4 and v5,
securing a payoff of −1 from v4 (because of the lim inf definition of TP). Hence, the values
of x3, x4 and x5 are respectively 1, −1 and 0. In this game, we have F(x3, x4, x5) =
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v1 v2 v3
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Figure 2 Two weighted graphs
(
2+x4,max(−2+x3,−1+x5), 1+x4
)
, and the vector (1,−1, 0) is indeed a fixed point of F .
However, it is neither the greatest nor the smallest fixed point of F , since if x is a fixed
point of F , then x+(a, a, a) is also a fixed point, for all constant a ∈ Z. If we try to initialise
the value iteration algorithm with value (0, 0, 0), which could seem a reasonable choice, the
sequence of computed vectors is: (0, 0, 0), (2,−1, 1), (1, 0, 0), (2,−1, 1), (1, 0, 0), . . . that is
not stationary, and does not even contain (1,−1, 0). Thus, it seems difficult to compute the
actual game values with an iterative algorithm relying on the F operator, as in the case
of mean-payoff games.3 Notice that, in the previous example, the Zwick and Paterson’s
algorithm [17] to solve mean-payoff games would easily conclude from the sequence above,
since the vectors of interest are then the one divided by the length of the current sequence,
i.e., (0, 0, 0), (1,−0.5, 0.5), (0.33, 0, 0), (0.5,−0.25, 0.25), (0.2, 0, 0), . . . indeed converging
towards (0, 0, 0), the mean-payoff values of this game.
Instead, as explained in the introduction, we propose a different approach that consists
in reducing total-payoff games to min-cost reachability games where Min must enforce a
reachability objective on top of his optimisation objective. The aim of the next section is to
study these games, and we reduce total-payoff games to them in Section 4.
3 Min-cost reachability games
In this section, we consider min-cost reachability games (MCR games for short), a variant of
total-payoff games where one player has a reachability objective that he must fulfil first, before
optimising his quantitative objective. Without loss of generality, we assign the reachability
objective to player Min, as this will make our reduction from total-payoff games easier to
explain. Hence, when the target is not reached along a path, its payoff shall be the worst
possible for Min, i.e., +∞. Formally, an MCR game is played on a weighted graph 〈V,E, ω〉
equipped with a target set of vertices T ⊆ V . The payoff T -MCR(pi) of a play pi = v0v1 . . .
is given by T -MCR(pi) = +∞ if the play avoids T , i.e., if for all k > 0, vk /∈ T , and
T -MCR(pi) = TP(pi[k]) if k is the least position in pi such that vk ∈ T . Lower and upper
values are then defined as in Section 2. By an indirect consequence of Martin’s theorem [12],
we can show that MCR games are also determined. Optimal strategies may however not
exist, as we will see later.
As an example, consider the MCR game played on the weighted graph of Figure 2(a),
where W is a positive integer and v3 is the target. We claim that the values of vertices v1
and v2 are both −W . Indeed, consider the following strategy for Min: during each of the first
W visits to v2 (if any), go to v1; else, go to v3. Clearly, this strategy ensures that the target
will eventually be reached, and that either (i) edge (v1, v3) (with weight −W ) will eventually
be traversed; or (ii) edge (v1, v2) (with weight −1) will be traversed at least W times. Hence,
3 In the context of stochastic models like Markov decision processes, Strauch [14] already noticed that in
the presence of arbitrary weights, the value iteration algorithm does not necessarily converge towards
the accurate value: see [13, Ex. 7.3.3] for a detailed explanation.
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in all plays following this strategy, the payoff will be at most −W . This strategy allows Min
to secure −W , but he cannot ensure a lower payoff, since Max always has the opportunity to
take the edge (v1, v3) (with weight −W ) instead of cycling between v1 and v2. Hence, Max’s
optimal choice is to follow the edge (v1, v3) as soon as v1 is reached, securing a payoff of −W .
The Min strategy we have just given is optimal, and there is no optimal memoryless strategy
for Min. Indeed, always playing (v2, v3) does not ensure a payoff 6 −W ; and, always playing
(v2, v1) does not guarantee to reach the target, and this strategy has thus value +∞.
Let us note that Björklund and Vorobyov introduce in [1] the longest shortest path problem
(LSP for short) and propose a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm to solve it. However, their
definition has several subtle but important differences to ours, such as definition of the payoff
of a play (equivalently, the length of a path). As an example, in the game of Figure 2(a), the
play pi = (v1v2)ω (that never reaches the target) has length −∞ in their setting, while, in our
setting, {v3}-MCR(pi) = +∞. Moreover, even if a pre-treatment would hypothetically allow
one to use the LSP algorithm to solve MCR games, our solution is simpler to implement
with the same worst-case complexity and heuristics only applicable to our value iteration
solution. We now present our contributions for MCR games:
I Theorem 1. Let G = 〈V,E, ω, T -MCR〉 be an MCR game.
1. For v ∈ V , deciding whether Val(v) = +∞ can be done in polynomial time.
2. For v ∈ V , deciding whether Val(v) = −∞ is as hard as mean-payoff, in NP∩ co-NP and
can be achieved in pseudo-polynomial time.
3. If Val(v) 6= −∞ for all vertices v ∈ V , then both players have optimal strategies. Moreover,
Max always has a memoryless optimal strategy, while Min may require finite (pseudo-
polynomial) memory in his optimal strategy.
4. Computing all values Val(v) (for v ∈ V ), as well as optimal strategies (if they exist) for
both players, can be done in (pseudo-polynomial) time O(|V |2|E|W ).
To prove the first item it suffices to notice that vertices with value +∞ are exactly those
from which Min cannot reach the target. Therefore the problem reduces to deciding the
winner in a classical reachability game, that can be solved in polynomial time [16], using the
classical attractor construction: in vertices of value +∞, Min may play indifferently, while
Max has an optimal memoryless strategy consisting in avoiding the attractor.
To prove the second item, it suffices first to notice that vertices with value −∞ are exactly
those with a value < 0 in the mean-payoff game played on the same graph. On the other
hand, we can show that any mean-payoff game can be transformed (in polynomial time)
into an MCR game such that a vertex has value < 0 in the mean-payoff game if and only
if the value of its corresponding vertex in the MCR game is −∞. The rest of this section
focuses on the proof of the third and fourth items. We start by explaining how to compute
the values in pseudo-polynomial, and we discuss optimal strategies afterward.
Computing the values. From now on, we assume, without loss of generality, that there is
exactly one target vertex denoted by t, and the only outgoing edge from t is a self loop
with weight 0: this is reflected by denotingMCR the payoff mapping {t}-MCR. Our value
iteration algorithm for MCR games is given in Algorithm 1. To establish its correctness, we
rely mainly on the operator F , which denotes the function ZV∞ → ZV∞ mapping every vector
x ∈ ZV∞ to F(x) defined by F(x)(t) = 0 and
F(x)(v) =

max
v′∈E(v)
(
ω(v, v′) + x(v′)
)
if v ∈ VMax \ {t}
min
v′∈E(v)
(
ω(v, v′) + x(v′)
)
if v ∈ VMin \ {t}
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Algorithm 1: Value iteration for min-cost reachability games
Input: MCR game 〈V,E, ω,MCR〉, W largest weight in absolute value
1 X(t) := 0
2 foreach v ∈ V \ {t} do X(v) := +∞
3 repeat
4 Xpre := X
5 foreach v ∈ VMax \ {t} do X(v) := maxv′∈E(v)
(
ω(v, v′) + Xpre(v′)
)
6 foreach v ∈ VMin \ {t} do X(v) := minv′∈E(v)
(
ω(v, v′) + Xpre(v′)
)
7 foreach v ∈ V \ {t} such that X(v) < −(|V | − 1)W do X(v) := −∞
8 until X = Xpre
9 return X
More precisely, we are interested in the sequence of iterates xi = F(xi−1) of F from the initial
vector x0 defined by x0(v) = +∞ for all v 6= t, and x0(t) = 0. The intuition behind the
sequence (xi)i>0 is that xi is the value of the game if we impose that Min must reach the target
within i steps (and get a payoff of +∞ if he fails to do so). Formally, for a play pi = v0v1 · · ·
vi · · · , we let MCR6i(pi) = MCR(pi) if vk = t for some k 6 i, and MCR6i(pi) = +∞
otherwise. We further let Val6i(v) = infσMin supσMax MCR
6i(Play(v, σMax, σMin)) (where σMax
and σMin are respectively strategies of Max and Min). We can show that the operator F
allows one to compute the sequence (Val6i)i>0, i.e., for all i > 0: xi = Val
6i.
Let us first show that the algorithm is correct when the values of all nodes are finite.
Thanks to this characterisation, and by definition of Val6i, it is easy to see that, for all
i > 0: xi = Val
6i < Val = Val. Moreover, F is a monotonic operator over the complete
lattice ZV∞. By Knaster-Tarski’s theorem, the fixed points of F form a complete lattice and
F admits a greatest fixed point. By Kleene’s fixed point theorem, using the Scott-continuity
of F , this greatest fixed point can be obtained as the limit of the non-increasing sequence of
iterates (F i(x))i>0 starting in the maximal vector x defined by x(v) = +∞ for all v ∈ V .
As x0 = F(x), the sequence (xi)i>0 is also non-increasing (i.e., xi < xi+1, for all i > 0)
and converges towards the greatest fixed point of F . We can further show that the value
of the game Val is actually the greatest fixed point of F . Moreover, we can bound the
number of steps needed to reach that fixed point (when all values are finite—this is the point
where this hypothesis is crucial), by carefully observing the possible vectors that can be
computed by the algorithm: the sequence (xi)i>0 is non-increasing, and stabilises after at
most (2|V | − 1)W |V |+ |V | steps on Val.
Thus, computing the sequence (xi)i>0 up to stabilisation yields the values of all vertices
in an MCR game if all values are finite. Were it not for line 7, Algorithm 1 would compute
exactly this sequence. We claim that Algorithm 1 is correct even when vertices have values
in {−∞,+∞}. Line 7 allows to cope with vertices whose value is −∞: when the algorithm
detects that Min can secure a value small enough from a vertex v, it sets v’s value to −∞.
Intuitively, this is correct because if Min can guarantee a payoff smaller than −(|V | − 1)×W ,
he can force a negative cycle from which he can reach t with an arbitrarily small value.
Hence, one can ensure that, after i iterations of the loop, xi−1 < X < Val, and the sequence
still converges to Val, the greatest fixed point of F . Finally, if some vertex v has value +∞,
one can check that X(v) = +∞ is an invariant of the loop. From that point, one can prove
the correctness of the algorithm. Thus, the algorithm executes O(|V |2W ) iterations. Since
each iteration can be performed in O(|E|), the algorithm has a complexity of O(|V |2|E|W ),
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as announced in Theorem 1. As an example, consider the min-cost reachability game of
Figure 2(a). The successive values for vertices (v1, v2) (value of the target v3 is always 0)
computed by the value iteration algorithm are the following: (+∞,+∞), (+∞, 0), (−1, 0),
(−1,−1), (−2,−1), (−2,−2), . . . , (−W,−W + 1), (−W,−W ). This requires 2W steps to
converge (hence a pseudo-polynomial time).
Computing optimal strategies for both players. We now turn to the proof of the third
item of Theorem 1, supposing that every vertex v of the game has a finite value Val(v) ∈ Z
(the case where Val(v) = +∞ is delt with the attractor construction).
Observe first that, Min may need memory to play optimally, as already shown by the
example in Figure 2(a), where the target is v3. Nevertheless, let us briefly explain why
optimal strategies for Min always exist, with a memory of pseudo-polynomial size. We extract
from the sequence (xi)i>0 defined above (or equivalently, from the sequence of vectors X of
Algorithm 1) the optimal strategy σ∗Min as follows. Let k be the first index such that xk+1 = xk.
Then, for every play pi ending in vertex v ∈ VMin, we let σ∗Min(pi) = argminv′∈E(v)
(
ω(v, v′) +
xk−|pi|−1(v′)
)
, if |pi| < k, and σ∗Min(pi) = argminv′∈E(v)
(
ω(v, v′) + x0(v′)
)
otherwise (those
argmin may not be unique, but we can indifferently pick any of them). Since σMin only requires
to know the last vertex and the length of the prefix up to k, and since k 6 (2|V |−1)W |V |+|V |
as explained above, σ∗Min needs a memory of pseudo-polynomial size only. Moreover, it can
be computed with the sequence of vectors X in Algorithm 1. It is not difficult to verify by
induction that this strategy is optimal for Min. While optimal, this strategy might not be
practical, for instance, in the framework of controller synthesis. Implementing it would require
to store the full sequence (xi)i>0 up to convergence step k (possibly pseudo-polynomial) in a
table, and to query this large table each time the strategy is called. Instead, an alternative
optimal strategy σ′Min can be construct, that consists in playing successively two memoryless
strategies σ1Min and σ2Min (σ2Min being given by the attractor construction). To determine when
to switch from σ1Min to σ2Min, σ′Min maintains a counter that is stored in a polynomial number
of bits, thus the memory footprints of σ′Min and σ∗Min are comparable. However, σ′Min is easier
to implement, because σ1Min and σ2Min can be described by a pair of tables of linear size, and,
apart from querying those tables, σ′Min consists only in incrementing and testing the counter
to determine when to switch. Moreover, this succession of two memoryless strategies allows
us to also get some interesting strategy in case of vertices with values −∞: indeed, we can
still compute this pair of strategies, and simply modify the switching policy to run for a
sufficiently long time to guarantee a value less than a given threshold. In the following, we
call such a strategy a switching strategy.
Finally, we can show that, contrary to Min, Max always has a memoryless optimal strategy
σ∗Max defined by σ∗Max(pi) = argmaxv′∈E(v) (ω(v, v′) + Val(v′)) for all finite plays pi ending in
v ∈ VMax. For example, in the game of Figure 2(a), σ∗Max(piv2) = v3 for all pi, since Val(v3) = 0
and Val(v1) = −W . Moreover, the previously described optimal strategies can be computed
along the execution of Algorithm 1. Finally, we can show that, for all vertices v, the pair of
optimal strategies we have just defined yields a play Play(v, σ∗Max, σ∗Min) which is non-looping,
i.e., never visits the same vertex twice before reaching the target. For instance, still in the
game of Figure 2(a), Play(v1, σ∗Max, σ∗Min) = v1v2vω3 .
4 An efficient algorithm to solve total-payoff games
We now turn our attention back to total-payoff games (without reachability objective), and
discuss our main contribution. Building on the results of the previous section, we introduce
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Figure 3 MCR game G3 associated with the total-payoff game of Figure 2(a)
the first (as far as we know) pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for solving those games in
the presence of arbitrary weights, thanks to a reduction from total-payoff games to min-cost
reachability games. The MCR game produced by the reduction has size pseudo-polynomial
in the size of the original total-payoff game. Then, we show how to compute the values of
the total-payoff game without building the entire MCR game, and explain how to deduce
memoryless optimal strategies from the computation of our algorithm.
Reduction to min-cost reachability games. We provide a transformation from a total-
payoff game G = 〈V,E, ω,TP〉 to a min-cost reachability game GK such that the values of G
can be extracted from the values in GK (as formalised below). Intuitively, GK simulates the
game where players play in G; Min may propose to stop playing and reach a fresh vertex t
acting as the target; Max can then accept, in which case we reach the target, or refuse at most
K times, in which case the game continues. Structurally, GK consists of a sequence of copies
of G along with some new states that we now describe formally. We let t be a fresh vertex,
and, for all n > 1, we define the min-cost reachability game Gn = 〈V n, En, ωn, {t}-MCR〉
where V nMax (respectively, V nMin) consists of n copies (v, j), with 1 6 j 6 n, of each vertex
v ∈ VMax (respectively, v ∈ VMin) and some exterior vertices (ex, v, j) for all v ∈ V and
1 6 j 6 n (respectively, interior vertices (in, v, j) for all v ∈ V and 1 6 j 6 n). Moreover,
V nMax contains the fresh target vertex t. Edges are given by
En = {(t, t)} unionmulti {((v, j), (in, v′, j)) | (v, v′) ∈ E, 1 6 j 6 n}
unionmulti {((in, v, j), (v, j)) | v ∈ V, 1 6 j 6 n} unionmulti {((ex, v, j), t) | v ∈ V, 1 6 j 6 n}
unionmulti {((in, v, j), (ex, v, j)) | v ∈ V, 1 6 j 6 n}
unionmulti {((ex, v, j), (v, j − 1)) | v ∈ V, 1 < j 6 n} .
All edge weights are zero, except edges
(
(v, j), (in, v′, j)
)
that have weight ω(v, v′).
For example, considering the weighted graph of Figure 2(a), the corresponding reachability
total-payoff game G3 is depicted in Figure 3 (where weights 0 have been removed). The next
proposition formalises the relationship between the two games.
I Proposition 2. Let K = |V |(2(|V | − 1)W + 1). For all v ∈ V and k > K,
ValG(v) 6= +∞ if and only if ValG(v) = ValGk((v, k));
ValG(v) = +∞ if and only if ValGk((v, k)) > (|V | − 1)W + 1.
The bound K is found by using the fact (informally described in the previous section) that
if not infinite, the value of a min-cost reachability game belongs in [−(|V |−1)×W+1, |V |×W ],
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Figure 4 MCR game GY associated with the total-payoff game of Figure 2(a)
and that after enough visits of the same vertex, an adequate loop ensures that Gk verifies
the above properties.
Value iteration algorithm for total-payoff games. By Proposition 2, an immediate way to
obtain a value iteration algorithm for total-payoff games is to build game GK , run Algorithm 1
on it, and map the computed values back to G. We take advantage of the structure of GK
to provide a better algorithm that avoids building GK . We first compute the values of the
vertices in the last copy of the game (vertices of the form (v, 1), (in, v, 1) and (ex, v, 1)), then
of those in the penultimate (vertices of the form (v, 2), (in, v, 2) and (ex, v, 2)), and so on.
We formalise this idea as follows. Let Zj be a vector mapping each vertex v of G to the
value Zj(v) of vertex (v, j) in GK . Then, let us define an operator H such that Zj+1 = H(Zj).
The intuition behind the definition of H(Y ) for some vector Y , is to extract from GK one copy
of the game, and make Y appear in the weights of some edges as illustrated in Figure 4. This
game, GY , simulates a play in G in which Min can opt for ‘leaving the game’ at each round
(by moving to the target), obtaining max(0, Y (v)), if v is the current vertex. Then H(Y )(v)
is defined as the value of v in GY . By construction, it is easy to see that Zj+1 = H(Zj) holds
for all j > 1. Furthermore, we define Z0(v) = −∞ for all v, and have Z1 = H(Z0). One can
prove the following properties of H: (i) H is monotonic, but may not be Scott-continuous;
(ii) the sequence (Zj)j>0 converges towards ValG .
We are now ready to introduce Algorithm 2 to solve total-payoff games. Intuitively, the
outer loop computes, in variable Y, a non-decreasing sequence of vectors whose limit is ValG ,
and that is stationary (this is not necessarily the case for the sequence (Zj)j>0). Line 1
initialises Y to Z0. Each iteration of the outer loop amounts to running Algorithm 1 to
compute H(Ypre) (lines 3 to 10), then detecting if some vertices have value +∞, updating Y
accordingly (line 11, following the second item of Proposition 2). One can show that, for all
j > 0, if we let Y j be the value of Y after the j-th iteration of the main loop, Zj 4 Y j 4 ValG ,
which ensures the correctness of the algorithm.
I Theorem 3. If a total-payoff game G = 〈V,E, ω,TP〉 is given as input, Algorithm 2
outputs the vector ValG of optimal values, after at most K = |V |(2(|V | − 1)W + 1) iterations
of the external loop. The complexity of the algorithm is O(|V |4|E|W 2).
The number of iterations in each internal loop is controlled by Theorem 1. On the example
of Figure 2(a), only 2 external iterations are necessary, but the number of iterations of each
internal loop would be 2W . By contrast, for the total-payoff game depicted in Figure 2(b),
each internal loop requires 2 iterations to converge, but the external loop takes W iterations
to stabilise. A combination of both examples would experience a pseudo-polynomial number
of iterations to converge in both the internal and external loops, matching the W 2 term of
the above complexity.
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Algorithm 2: A value iteration algorithm for total-payoff games
Input: Total-payoff game G = 〈V,E, ω,TP〉, W largest weight in absolute value
1 foreach v ∈ V do Y(v) := −∞
2 repeat
3 foreach v ∈ V do Ypre(v) := Y(v); Y(v) := max(0,Y(v)); X(v) := +∞
4 repeat
5 Xpre := X
6 foreach v ∈ VMax do X(v) := maxv′∈E(v)
[
ω(v, v′) + min(Xpre(v′),Y(v′))
]
7 foreach v ∈ VMin do X(v) := minv′∈E(v)
[
ω(v, v′) + min(Xpre(v′),Y(v′))
]
8 foreach v ∈ V such that X(v) < −(|V | − 1)W do X(v) := −∞
9 until X = Xpre
10 Y := X
11 foreach v ∈ V such that Y(v) > (|V | − 1)W do Y(v) := +∞
12 until Y = Ypre
13 return Y
Optimal strategies. In Section 3, we have shown, for any min-cost reachability game, the
existence of a pair of memoryless strategies permitting to reconstruct a switching optimal
strategy for Min (if every vertex has value different from −∞, or a strategy ensuring any
possible threshold for vertices with value −∞). If we apply this construction to the game
GValG , we obtain a pair (σ1Min, σ2Min) of strategies (remember that σ2Min is a strategy obtained by
the attractor construction, hence it will not be useful for us for total-payoff games). Consider
the strategy σMin, obtained by projecting σ1Min on V as follows: for all finite plays pi and
vertex v ∈ VMin, let σMin(piv) = v′ if σ1Min(v) = (in, v′). We can show that σMin is optimal for
Min in G. Notice that σ1Min, and hence σMin, can be computed during the last iteration of
the value iteration algorithm, as explained in the case of min-cost reachability. A similar
construction can be done to compute an optimal strategy of Max.
5 Implementation and heuristics
In this section, we report on a prototype implementation of our algorithms.4 For convenience
reasons, we have implemented them as an add-on to PRISM-games [5], although we could
have chosen to extend another model-checker as we do not rely on the probabilistic features
of PRISM models (i.e., we use the PRISM syntax of stochastic multi-player games, allowing
arbitrary rewards, and forbidding probability distributions different of Dirac ones). We then
use rPATL specifications of the form 〈〈C〉〉Rmin /max=?[F∞ϕ] and 〈〈C〉〉Rmin /max=?[Fc⊥] to
model respectively min-cost reachability games and total-payoff games, where C represents
a coalition of players that want to minimise/maximise the payoff, and ϕ is another rPATL
formula describing the target set of vertices (for total-payoff games, such a formula is not
necessary). We have tested our implementation on toy examples. On the parametric one
studied after Theorem 3, obtained by mixing the graphs of Figure 2 and repeating them for
n layers, results obtained by applying our algorithm for total-payoff games are summarised in
Table 1, where for each pair (W,n), we give the time t in seconds, the number ke of iterations
4 Source and binary files, as well as some examples, can be downloaded from http://www.ulb.ac.be/di/
verif/monmege/tool/TP-MCR/.
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Table 1 Results of value iteration on a parametric example
without heuristics with heuristics
W n t ke ki t ke ki
50 100 0.52s 151 12,603 0.01s 402 1,404
50 500 9.83s 551 53,003 0.42s 2,002 7,004
200 100 2.96s 301 80,103 0.02s 402 1,404
200 500 45.64s 701 240,503 0.47s 2,002 7,004
500 1,000 536s 1,501 1,251,003 2.37s 4,002 14,004
in the external loop, and the total number ki of iterations in the internal loop.
We close this section by sketching two techniques that can be used to speed up the
computation of the fixed point in Algorithms 1 and 2. We fix a weighted graph 〈V,E, ω〉.
Both accelerations rely on a topological order of the strongly connected components (SCC
for short) of the graph, given as a function c : V → N, mapping each vertex to its component,
verifying that (i) c(V ) = {0, . . . , p} for some p > 0, (ii) c−1(q) is a maximal SCC for all q,
(iii) and c(v) > c(v′) for all (v, v′) ∈ E.5 In case of an MRC game with t the unique target,
c−1(0) = {t}. Intuitively, c induces a directed acyclic graph whose vertices are the sets
c−1(q) for all q ∈ c(V ), and with an edge (S1, S2) if and only if there are v1 ∈ S1, v2 ∈ S2
such that (v1, v2) ∈ E.
The first acceleration heuristic is a divide-and-conquer technique that consists in applying
Algorithm 1 (or the inner loop of Algorithm 2) iteratively on each c−1(q) for q = 0, 1, 2, . . . , p,
using at each step the information computed during steps j < q (since the value of a
vertex v depends only on the values of the vertices v′ such that c(v′) 6 c(v)). The second
acceleration heuristic consists in studying more precisely each component c−1(q). Having
already computed the optimal values Val(v) of vertices v ∈ c−1({0, . . . , q − 1}), we ask
an oracle to precompute a finite set Sv ⊆ Z∞ of possible optimal values for each vertex
v ∈ c−1(q). For MCR games and the inner iteration of the algorithm for total-payoff games,
one way to construct such a set Sv is to consider that possible optimal values are the one of
non-looping paths inside the component exiting it, since, in MCR games, there exist optimal
strategies for both players whose outcome is a non-looping path (see Section 3).
We can identify classes of weighted graphs for which there exists an oracle that runs in
polynomial time and returns, for all vertices v, a set Sv of polynomial size. On such classes,
Algorithms 1 and 2, enhanced with our two acceleration techniques, run in polynomial time.
For instance, for all fixed positive integers L, the class of weighted graphs where every
component c−1(q) uses at most L distinct weights (that can be arbitrarily large in absolute
value) satisfies this criterion. Table 1 contains the results obtained with the heuristics on the
parametric example presented before. Observe that the acceleration technique permits here
to decrease drastically the execution time, the number of iterations in both loops depending
not even anymore on W . Even though the number of iterations in the external loop increases
with heuristics, due to the decomposition, less computation is required in each internal loop
since we only apply the computation for the active component.
5 Such a mapping is computable in linear time, e.g., by Tarjan’s algorithm [15].
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A Determinacy of total-payoff and min-cost reachability games
Consider a quantitative game G = 〈V,E, ω,P〉 and a vertex v ∈ V . We will prove the determinacy result by
using the Borel determinacy result of [12]. Indeed, for an integer M , consider WinM to be the set of infinite plays
with a payoff less than or equal to M . Payoff mapping T -MCR is easily shown to be Borel measurable since the
set of plays with finite payoff is then a countable union of open sets of plays. For TP, it is shown by considering
a pointwise limit of Borel measurable functions. Therefore, for payoff P representing total-payoff and min-cost
reachability, we know that WinM is a Borel set, so that the qualitative game defined over the graph 〈V,E, ω〉
with winning condition WinM is determined. We now use this preliminary result to show our determinacy result.
We first consider cases where lower or upper values are infinite. Suppose first that Val(v) = −∞. We have to
show that Val(v) = −∞ too. Let M be an integer. From Val(v) < M , we know that for all strategy σMax of Max,
there exists a strategy σMin for Min, such that P(Play(v, σMax, σMin)) 6M . In particular, Max has no winning
strategy in the qualitative game equipped with WinM as a winning condition. By the previous determinacy
result, we know that Min has a winning strategy in that case, i.e., a strategy σMin such that every strategy σMax
of Max verifies P(Play(v, σMax, σMin)) 6 M . This exactly means that Val(v) 6 M . Since this holds for every
value M , we get that Val(v) = −∞. The proof goes exactly in a symetrical way to show that Val(v) = +∞
implies Val(v) = +∞.
Consider then the case where both Val(v) and Val(v) are finite values. Suppose that Val(v) < Val(v) and
consider a real number r strictly in-between those two values. From r < Val(v), we deduce that Min has no
winning strategy from v in the qualitative game with winning condition Winr. Identically, from Val(v) < r, we
deduce that Max has no winning strategy from v in the same game. This contradicts the determinacy of this
qualitative game. Hence, Val(v) = Val(v).
B Comparison with the longest shortest path problem of Björklund and Vorobyov
Björklund and Vorobyov have studied games related to our min-cost reachability games, as the longest shortest
path problem (LSP for short) in [1]. To clarify the following discussion, let us recall the definition of LSP,
adapted to our syntax.
The LSP problem considers a weighted graph G, whose vertices are partitioned into two players, and equipped
with a single target vertex t. The problem asks to find a memoryless strategy σMax of Max such that in the
graph GσMax , obtained from G by deleting all outgoing edges from vertices of VMax except those selected in σMax,
the length of the shortest path from every vertex to the target t is as large as possible (over all memoryless
strategies). The definition of paths from a vertex v to the target is, however, very different from ours: such a
path may indeed be a finite play, without cycle, from v to the target t (in which case its length is the sum of the
weights of edges). However, any cycle containing v (even if it cannot reach the target) is also considered as a
path to the target. The length of such cycle is defined as follows:
1. if the cycle has a negative weight, its length is −∞;
2. else, if it has a positive weight, its length is +∞;
3. else, if it has zero weight, its length is 0.
Consider, as an example, the weighted graph of Fig. 5, where, once again, Max vertices are depicted with
circles. Clearly, vertices {v1, v2, v3} and {v4} form independant subgames. We first consider the status of v1, v2
and v3. In this subgame, Max has two possible strategies: σ1 that selects the (v1, v2) edge, or σ2 that selects the
(v1, v3) edge instead.
1. If we select σ1, we obtain the following values for v1, v2 and v3 respectively: 0, 0 and 1. Indeed, from vertex
v2, we can loop in the zero cycle in-between v1 and v2, which is better than the simple path to the target
(having weight 3), so that the distance from v1 and v2 is 0. From vertex v3, only a single path leads to the
target with weight 1.
2. If we select σ2, we obtain the following values for v1, v2 and v3 respectively: 1, 3 and 1. Indeed, from vertex
v3, the distance is the length of the simple path to the target, which is better than looping in-between v1 and
v3 with a positive weight cycle. Hence, from vertex v1, the distance is 1 too, whereas from v2, the distance is
3.
Now, let us turn our attention to v4. Again, we must consider two strategies: strategy σ3 selects the (v4, v4)
edge (the self-loop on v4) and strategy σ4 selects the (v4, t) edge.
1. If we select σ3, we obtain value −∞ for v4, because all plays starting in v4 loop in this negatively priced
cycle. Recall that with our definition of min-cost reachability, such a cycle that never reaches the target
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Figure 5 An instance of the longest shortest path problem
would yield a total-payoff of +∞, regardless of the weights. This is coherent with our intuition that the first
goal of Min is to reach the target.
2. If we select σ4, the value of v4 is now 0, which is thus better for Max.
Finally, the optimal strategy for Max is to choose edges (v1, v3) and (v4, t), leading to the LSP distances (1, 3, 1, 0)
for vertices (v1, v2, v3, v4). With our definition of min-cost reachability game, the situation is completely different:
the value vector is then (2, 3, 1,+∞), associated with the optimal strategy σMax selecting edges (v1, v2) and
(v4, v4).
Indeed, two main differences separate our two definitions. The first one is the treatment of negative weight
cycles. Actually, in LSP, the fact that after selecting strategy σMax a vertex cannot reach the target anymore
in GσMax does not prevent from mapping the distance −∞ to a vertex contained in a negative cycle. This is in
contrast with our definition, that would benefit to Max since in such a situation, the target is not reachable
leading to the value +∞.6 The second difference consists in the treatment of zero weight cycle. In LSP, a distance
zero is then computed, which is highly related with the fact that the authors want to apply the resolution of
LSP to mean-payoff games.
Nevertheless, in Section 9 of [1], the authors briefly study another more natural definition, mapping zero
weight cycle to the distance +∞ (closer to our definition). In that case, the LSP distances of vertices v1, v2 and
v3 then match our value vector in min-cost reachability games. Unfortunately, it is not clear how the algorithm
that is presented by Björklund and Vorobyov can be adapted to accomodate this new definition of the cost and
compute the values of the nodes. Indeed, Proposition 9.1 of [1] proves that the decision version of the LSP (i.e.,
deciding if the LSP of a vertex is positive or not in a given graph) is in NP ∩ co-NP, and they claim (without
formal proof) that their pseudo-polynomial time algorithm permits to decide this problem. This requires a first
transformation of the problem, so that no zero weight cycles remain in the weighted graph. This transformation,
explained above Proposition 9.1, is correct but does not preserve the LSP of the vertices, so that their algorithm
do not compute the LSP distance of vertices, but only study their positivity.
Hence, the comparison between our definition of min-cost reachability and the definition of LSP can be
summarised as follows:
1. Either one relies on the first definition of LSP given in the paper. In this case, Björklund and Vorobyov
propose a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm to compute the LSP, but these values do not match our definition
of the min-cost reachability payoff, as demonstrated by the above example.
2. Or one relies on the second definition. In this case, we believe that the LSP values may match our definition
of min-cost reachability but the paper does not explain formally how to compute those new values.
It is plausible that the pseudo-polynomial time algorithm of Björklund and Vorobyov could be adapted to
compute the LSP value according to the second definition. Yet, even in this case, there are several points of
comparison worth mentioning:
1. The worst-case complexity of the algorithm proposed by Björklund and Vorobyov is O(|V |2|E|W ), which
matches ours (see Proposition 5). Nevertheless, our solution is much easier to describe and to implement:
while they must make repeated calls to a modified version of the Bellman-Ford algorithm (the modification is
crucial to obtain their complexity), we have a simple fixed point algorithm.
2. Our algorithm exploits the value iteration paradigm (that can be seen as a backward induction), while theirs
is a strategy iteration algorithm. Because of that, there are examples on which our algorithm is more efficient
that theirs (although the worst-case complexity is the same). As an example, the LSP instance presented in
Fig. 2 of [1], with 2n+ 1 vertices but a biggest weight W exponential in n, requires an exponential number
2n of iterations for the strategy iteration algorithm, but our value iteration algorithm (based on backward
6 We believe that this difference would certainly be eliminated by our precomputation of vertices of value +∞ presented in the
first item of Theorem 1.
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induction) would solve it in linear time with respect to n. More precisely, with our tool, we are able to
compute the values of this game in less than a millisecond for constant n = 15 (i.e., a game with 32 vertices
and largest weight W ≈ 2.68 · 108): the value of the initial state obtained is 4.74 · 109, and as aforementioned,
the number of iterations that our value iteration requires is 16, linear in n. Our tool being an add-on of the
PRISM model-checker, relying on the use of integer rewards, we have not been able to build the game for a
value n greater than 15.
3. We propose several acceleration heuristics that perform well on several examples we have tried. These
accelerations cannot easily be incorporated in their algorithm (because it is a strategy iteration algorithm).
4. Finally, from the theoretical point of view, Björklund and Vorobyov do not study the strategies of the
opponent player Min. In contrast, our study allows us to produce optimal strategies for both players, and in
particular, show that memoryless strategies may not be sufficient for Min, whereas they are enough for Max.
C Finding vertices of value +∞ in min-cost reachability games
Let G = 〈V,E, ω, T -MCR〉 be a min-cost reachability game. Notice that for all plays pi = v0v1 · · · , T -MCR(pi) =
+∞ if and only if vk /∈ T for all k > 0, i.e., pi avoids the target. Then, let us show that the classical attractor
technique [16] allows us to compute the set V+∞ = {v ∈ V | Val(v) = +∞}. Recall that the attractor of a set T
of vertices is obtained thanks to the sequence Attr0(T ), . . . ,Attri(T ), . . . where: Attr0(T ) = T ; and for all i > 0:
Attri+1(T ) = Attri(T ) ∪ {v ∈ VMin | E(v) ∩ Attri(T ) 6= ∅} ∪ {v ∈ VMax | E(v) ⊆ Attri(T )} .
It is well-known that this sequence converges after at most |V | steps to the set Attr(T ) of all vertices from which
Min has a memoryless strategy to ensure reaching T . Hence, under our hypothesis, V+∞ = V \ Attr(T ). This
proves the first item of Theorem 1.
D Finding vertices of value −∞ in min-cost reachability games
We give here the proof of the following aiming at computing the set V−∞ of vertices with a value −∞ in a
min-cost reachability game G = 〈V,E, ω, T -MCR〉, from which we suppose that there is no more vertices with
value +∞.
I Proposition 4. For all MCR game G = 〈V,E, ω,MCR〉, for all vertices v of G, ValG(v) = −∞ if and only
if ValG′(v) < 0, where G′ is the mean-payoff game 〈V,E, ω,MP〉. Conversely, given a mean-payoff game
G = 〈V,E, ω,MP〉, we can build, in polynomial time, an MCR game G′ such that for all vertices v of G:
ValG(v) < 0 if and only if ValG′(v) = −∞.
Proof. Consider first a min-cost reachability game G = 〈V,E, ω, T -MCR〉 such that ValG(v) 6= +∞ for all
v ∈ V , and G′ = 〈V,E, ω,MP〉 the same weighted graph equipped of a mean-payoff objective.
If ValG′(v) < 0, the outcome starting in v and following a profile (σ∗Max, σ∗Min) of optimal memoryless strategies
necessarily starts with a finite prefix and then loops in a cycle with a total weight less than 0. For every
M > 0, we construct a strategy σMin that ensures in G a cost less than or equal to −M : this will prove that
ValG(v) = −∞. Since in every vertex of G′, Min has a strategy in G to reach the final vertices (otherwise there
would exist a vertex with value +∞), there exists w′′ such that Min can reach from any vertex of G′ the target
with a cost at most w′′. The strategy σMin of Min is then to follow σ∗Min until the accumulated cost is less than
−M − w′′ (which we can prove will happen), at which point it follows its strategy to reach the target.
Reciprocally, if ValG(v) = −∞, consider M = |V |W and a strategy σMMin of Min ensuring a cost less than −M ,
i.e., such that Val(v, σMMin) < −M . Consider the finitely-branching tree built from G by unfolding the game from
vertex v and resolving the choices of Min with strategy σMMin. Each branch of this tree corresponds to a possible
strategy of Max. Since this strategy generates a finite cost, we are certain that every such branch leads to a
vertex of T . If we trim the tree at those vertices, we finally obtain a finite tree. Now, for a contradiction, suppose
the optimal memoryless strategy σ∗Max of Max ensures a non-negative mean-payoff, that is, ValG′(v, σ∗Max) > 0.
Consider the branch of the previous tree where Max follows strategy σ∗Max. Since this finite branch has cost less
than −M = −|V |W , we know for sure that there is two occurrences of the same vertex v′ with an in-between
weight less than 0: otherwise, by removing all nonnegative cycles, we obtain a play without repetition of vertices,
henceforth of length bounded by |V |, and therefore of cost at least −M . Suppose that v′ ∈ VMax. Then, Min has
a strategy σMin to ensure a negative mean-payoff ValG′(v, σMin) < 0: indeed, it simply modifies its strategy so that
it always follows his choices made in the negative cycle starting in v′, ensuring that, against the optimal strategy
σ∗Max of Max, he gets a mean-payoff being the cost of the cycle. This is a contradiction since Max is supposed
to have a strategy ensuring a non-negative mean-payoff from v. Hence, v′ ∈ VMin. But the same contradiction
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appears in that case since Min can force that it always stays in the negative cycle by modifying his strategy.
Finally, we have proved that Max cannot have a memoryless strategy ensuring a non-negative mean-payoff from
v. By memoryless determinacy of the mean-payoff games, this ensures that Min has a memoryless strategy
ensuring a negative mean-payoff from v.
Hence, we have shown that ValG(v) = −∞ if and only if ValG′(v) < 0, which concludes the first claim of
Proposition 4.
Conversely, we reduce mean-payoff games to min-cost reachability games as follows. Let G = 〈V,E, ω,MP〉
be a mean-payoff game. Without loss of generality, we may suppose that the graph of the game is bipartite, in
the sense that E ⊆ VMax ×VMin ∪VMin×VMax. The problem we are interested in is to decide whether ValG(v) < 0
for a given vertex v. We now construct a min-cost reachability game G′ = 〈V ′, E′, ω′, T ′-MCR〉 from G. The
only difference is the presence of a fresh target vertex t on top of vertices of V : V ′ = V unionmulti {t} with T ′ = {t}.
Edges of A′ are given by E′ = E∪{(v, t) | v ∈ VMin}∪{(t, t)}. Weights of edges are given by: ω′(v, v′) = ω(v, v′)
if (v, v′) ∈ E, and ω′(v, t) = ω′(t, t) = 0. We show that ValG(v) < 0 if and only if ValG′(v) = −∞.
In G′, all values are different from +∞, since Min plays at least every two steps, and has the capability
to go to the target vertex with weight 0. Hence, letting G′′ = 〈V ′, E′, ω′,MP〉 the mean-payoff game on the
weighted graph of G′, by the previous direction, we have that for every vertex v ∈ V ′, ValG′(v) = −∞ if and
only if ValG′′(v) < 0.
To conclude, we prove that for all vertices v ∈ V , ValG′′(v) < 0 if and only if ValG(v) < 0. If ValG(v) < 0,
by mapping the memoryless optimal strategies of G into G′′, we directly obtain that ValG′′(v) 6 ValG(v) < 0.
Reciprocally, if ValG′′(v) < 0, we can project a profile of memoryless optimal strategies over vertices of G: the
play obtained from v in G is then the projection of the play obtained from v in G′′, with the same cost. Hence,
ValG(v) 6 ValG′′(v) < 0. J
E Computing finite values in min-cost reachability games
We now prove the correction of Algorithm 1, as stated below.
I Proposition 5. If an MCR game G = 〈V,E, ω,MCR〉 is given as input (possibly with values +∞ or −∞),
Algorithm 1 outputs ValG , after at most (2|V | − 1)W |V |+ 2|V | iterations.
Observe first that for all v ∈ V , for all i > 0, and for all strategies σMax and σMin:
MCR6i(Play(v, σMax, σMin)) >MCR(Play(v, σMax, σMin)) .
Indeed, if the target vertex t is reached within i steps, then both plays will have the same payoff. Otherwise,
MCR6i(Play(v, σMin, σMax)) = +∞. Thus, for all i > 1 and v ∈ V :
Val6i(v) > Val(v) = Val(v)
which can be rewritten as
Val6i < Val = Val .
Let us now consider the sequence (Val6i)i>0. We first give an alternative definition of this sequence permitting
to show its convergence.
I Lemma 6. For all i > 1, for all v ∈ V :
Val6i(v) =

max
v′∈E(v)
(
ω(v, v′) + Val6i−1(v′)
)
if v ∈ VMax \ {t}
min
v′∈E(v)
(
ω(v, v′) + Val6i−1(v′)
)
if v ∈ VMin \ {t}
0 if v = t
Proof. The lemma can be established by showing that Val6i(v) is the value in a game played on a finite tree of
depth i (i.e., by applying a backward induction). We adopt the following notation for labeled unordered trees. A
leaf is denoted by (v), where v ∈ V is the label of the leaf. A tree with root labeled by v and subtrees A1, . . . , An
is denoted by (v, {A1, . . . , An}). Then, for each v ∈ V and i > 0, we define Ai(v) as follows:
A0(v) = (v)
for all i > 1 : Ai(v) = (v, {Ai−1(v′) | (v, v′) ∈ E})
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Now, let us further label those trees by a value in Z ∪ {+∞} thanks to the function λ. For all tree of the form
A0(v) = (v), we let
λ(A0(v)) =
{
0 if v = t
+∞ if v¬t
For all tree of the form Ai(v) = (v, {Ai−1(v1), . . . , Ai−1(vm)}) (for some i > 1), we let
λ(Ai(v)) =

max
16j6m
(
ω(v, vj) + λ(Ai−1(vj))
)
if v ∈ VMax \ {t}
min
16j6m
(
ω(v, vj) + λ(Ai−1(vj))
)
if v ∈ VMin \ {t}
0 if v = t
(1)
Clearly, for all v ∈ V , for all i > 0, the branches of Ai(v) correspond to all the possible finite plays
Play(v, σMax, σMin)[i], i.e., there is a branch for each possible strategy profile (σMax, σMin). Thus, λ(Ai(v)) =
Val6i(v) for all i > 0, which permits us to conclude from (1). J
We have just shown that for all i > 1, Val6i = F(Val6i−1), so that xi = Val6i for all i > 0 (with xi defined
in page 8).
I Remark. Notice that, at this point, it would not be too difficult to show that Val is a fixed point of operator
F . However, it is more difficult to show that it is the greatest fixed point of F , and to deduce directly properties
over optimal strategies in the min-cost reachability game. Instead, we use the sequence (Val6i)i>0 to obtain
more interesting results on Val.
We now study refined properties of the sequence (Val6i)i>0, namely its stationarity and the speed of its
convergence. We start by characterizing how Val6i evolves over the first |V |+ 1 steps. The next lemma states
that, for each node v, the sequence Val60(v),Val61(v), . . . ,Val6i(v), . . . ,Val6|V |(v) is of the form
+∞,+∞, . . . ,+∞︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
, ak, ak+1, . . . , a|V |
where k is the step at which v has been added to the attractor, and each value ai is finite and bounded:
I Lemma 7. Let v ∈ V be a vertex and let 0 6 k 6 |V | be such that v ∈ Attrk({t}) \ Attrk−1({t}) (assuming
Attr−1({t}) = ∅). Then, for all 0 6 j 6 |V |: (i) j < k implies Val6j(v) = +∞ and (ii) j > k implies
Val6j(v) 6 jW .
Proof. We prove the property for all vertices v, by induction on j.
Base case: j = 0. We consider two cases. Either v = t. In this case, k = 0, and we must show that
Val60(v) 6 0×W = 0, which is true by definition of Val60. Or v 6= t. In this case, k > 0, and we must show
that Val60(v) = +∞, which is true again by definition of Val60.
Inductive case: j = ` > 1. Let us assume that the lemma holds for all v, for all values of j up to `− 1, and let
us show that it holds for all v, and for j = `. Let us fix a vertex v, and its associated value k. We consider two
cases.
1. First, assume k > `. In this case, we must show that Val6`(v) = +∞. We consider again two cases:
a. If v ∈ VMin, then none of its successors belong to Attr`−1({t}), otherwise, v would be in Attr`({t}), by
definition of the attractor, and we would have k 6 `. Hence, by induction hypothesis, Val6`−1(v′) = +∞
for all v′ such that (v, v′) ∈ E. Thus:
Val6`(v) = min
(v,v′)∈E
(
ω(v, v′) + Val6`−1(v′)
)
(Lemma 6)
= +∞
b. If v ∈ VMax, then at least one successor of v does not belong to Attr`−1({t}), otherwise, v would be in
Attr`({t}), by definition of the attractor, and we would have k 6 `. Hence, by induction hypothesis, there
exists v′ such that (v, v′) ∈ E and Val6`−1(v′) = +∞. Thus:
Val6`(v) = max
(v,v′)∈E
(
ω(v, v′) + Val6`−1(v′)
)
(Lemma 6)
= +∞
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2. Second, assume k 6 `. In this case, we must show that Val6`(v) 6 `W . As in the previous item, we consider
two cases:
a. In the case where v ∈ VMin, we let v be a vertex such that v ∈ Attrk−1({t}) and (v, v) ∈ E. Such a vertex
exists by definition of the attractor. By induction hypothesis, Val6`−1(v) 6 `W . Then:
Val6`(v) = min
(v,v′)∈E
(
ω(v, v′) + Val6`−1(v′)
)
(Lemma 6)
6 ω(v, v) + Val6`−1(v) ((v, v) ∈ E)
6 ω(v, v) + (`− 1)W (Ind. Hyp.)
6W + (`− 1)W
= `W
b. In the case where v ∈ VMax, we know that all successors v′ of v belong to Attrk−1({t}) by definition of the
attractor. By induction hypothesis, for all successors v′ of v: Val6`−1(v′) 6 `W .Hence:
Val6`(v) = max
(v,v′)∈E
(
ω(v, v′) + Val6`−1(v′)
)
(Lemma 6)
6 max
(v,v′)∈E
(W + (`− 1)W ) (Ind. Hyp.)
= `W .
J
In particular, this allows us to conclude that, after |V | steps, all values are bounded by |V |W :
I Corollary 8. For all v ∈ V : Val6|V |(v) 6 |V |W .
The next step is to show that the sequence stabilises after a bounded number of steps:
I Lemma 9. The sequence Val60, . . . ,Val6i, . . . stabilises after at most (2|V | − 1)W |V |+ |V | steps.
Proof. We first show that if Min can secure, from some vertex v, a payoff less than −(|V | − 1)W , i.e., Val(v) <
−(|V |−1)W , then it can secure an arbitrarily small payoff from that vertex, i.e., Val(v) = −∞, which contradicts
our hypothesis that the value is finite. Hence, let us suppose that there exists a strategy σMin for Min such
that Val(v, σMin) < −(|V | − 1)W . Let G′ be the mean-payoff game studied in Proposition 4. We will show that
ValG′(v) < 0, which permits to conclude that ValG(v) = −∞. Let σMax be a memoryless strategy of Max. By
hypothesis, we know that MCR(Play(v, σMax, σMin)) < −(|V | − 1)W . This ensures the existence of a cycle with
negative cost in the play Play(v, σMax, σMin): otherwise, we could iteratively remove every possible nonnegative
cycle of the finite play before reaching t (hence reducing the cost of the play) and obtain a play without cycles
before reaching t with a cost less than −(|V | − 1)W , which is impossible (since it should be of length at most
|V | − 1 to cross at most one occurrence of each vertex). Consider the first negative cycle in the play. After the
first occurrence of the cycle, we let Min choose its actions like in the cycle. By this way, we can construct another
strategy σ′Min for Min, verifying that for every memoryless strategy σMax of Max, we have MP(Play(v, σMax, σ′Min))
being the weight of the negative cycle in which the play finishes. Since for mean-payoff games, memoryless
strategies are sufficient for Max, we deduce that ValG′(v) < 0.
This reasoning permits to prove that at every step i, Val6i(v) > Val(v) > −(|V | − 1)W + 1 for all vertices v.
Recall from Corollary 8 that, after |V | steps in the sequence, all vertices are assigned a value smaller that |V |W .
Moreover, we know that the sequence is non-increasing. In summary, for all k > 0 and for all vertices v:
−(|V | − 1)W + 1 6 Val6|V |+k(v) 6 |V |W
Hence, in the worst case a strictly decreasing sequence will need (2|V |−1)W |V | steps to reach the lowest possible
value where all vertices are assigned −(|V | − 1)W + 1 from the highest possible value where all vertices are
assigned |V |W . Thus, taking into account the |V | steps to reach a finite value on all vertices, the sequence
stabilises in at most (2|V | − 1)W |V |+ |V | steps. J
Let us thus denote by Val6 the value obtained when the sequence (Val6i)i>0 stabilizes. We know from a
previous discussion that Val6 is the greatest fixed point of operator F . We are now ready to prove that this
value is the actual value of the game:
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I Lemma 10. For all min-cost reachability game: Val6 = Val .
Proof. We already know that Val6 < Val. Let us show that Val6 4 Val. Let v ∈ V be a vertex. Since Val(v) is
finite integer, there exists a strategy σMin for Min that realises this value, i.e.,
Val(v) = sup
σMax
MCR(Play(v, σMax, σMin)) .
Notice that this holds because the values are integers, enducing that the infimum in the definition of Val(v) = Val(v)
is indeed reached.
Let us build a tree AσMin unfolding all possible plays from v against σMin. AσMin has a root labeled by v. If a
tree node is labeled by a vertex v of Min, this tree node has a unique child labeled by σMin(v). If a tree node
is labeled by a vertex v of Max, this tree node has one child per successor v′ of v in the graph, labeled by v′.
We proceed this way until we encounter a node labeled by a vertex from t in which case this node is a leaf.
AσMin is necessarily finite. Otherwise, by König’s Lemma, it has one infinite branch that never reaches t. From
that infinite branch, one can extract a strategy σMax for Max such that MCR(Play(v, σMax, σMin)) = +∞, hence
Val(v) = +∞, which contradicts the hypothesis. Assume the tree has depth m. Then, AσMin is a subtree of the
tree A obtained by unfolding all possible plays up to length m (as in the proof of Lemma 6). In this case, it is
easy to check that the value labeling the root of AσMin after applying backward induction is larger than or equal
to the value labeling the root of A after applying backward induction. The latter is Val(v) while the former
is Val6m(v), by Lemma 6, so that Val(v) > Val6m(v). Since the sequence is non-increasing, we finally obtain
Val(v) > Val6(v). J
As a corollary of this lemma, we obtain:
I Corollary 11. Val is the greatest fixed point of F .
This permits to obtain a value iteration algorithm, described in Algorithm 1, that computes optimal values.
Notice that we do not suppose that every vertex has a finite value, which is justified in the proof of Proposition 5
below proving the correctness of the algorithm, as well as its complexity. A crucial argument is given in the
following lemma, following from the fact that Val is the greatest fixed point of F :
I Lemma 12. If the Kleene sequence (F i(x0))i>0 is initiated with a vector of values x0 that is greater or equal
to the optimal value vector Val, then the sequence converges at least as fast as before towards the optimal value
vector.
Proof of Proposition 5. Let us first suppose that values of every vertices are finite. Then, we can easily prove
by induction that at the beginning of the jth step of the loop, X is equal to the vector Val6j , and that the
condition of line 7 has never been fulfilled. Hence, by Lemma 9, after at most (2|V | − 1)W |V |+ |V | iterations,
all values are found correctly in that case.
Suppose now that there exist vertices with value +∞. Those vertices will remain at their initial value +∞
during the whole computation, and hence do not interfere with the rest of the computation.
Finally, consider that the game contains vertices with value −∞. We know that optimal values of vertices
of values different from −∞ are at least −(|V | − 1)W + 1 so that, if the value of a vertex reaches an integer
below −(|V | − 1)W , we are sure that its value is indeed −∞, which proves correct the line 7 of the algorithm.
This update may cost at most one step per vertices, which in total adds at most |V | iterations. Moreover, by
Lemma 12, dropping the value to −∞ does not harm the correction for the other vertices (it may only speed the
convergence of their values). J
F Computing optimal strategies in min-cost reachability games
This section is devoted to the formal construction of optimal strategies in MCR games, as explained briefly at
the end of Section 3.
F.1 Strategies of Min
We have already seen an example in Fig. 2 of a game where Min may need memory in an optimal strategy, i.e.,
where Min has an optimal strategy, but no memoryless optimal strategies. Reciprocally, as a consequence of the
previous work, we first show that, for vertices with finite value, Min has always a finite-memory optimal strategy.
I Proposition 13. In all min-cost reachability game with only vertices of finite values, Min has a finite-memory
optimal strategy.
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Proof. We explain how to reconstruct from the fixpoint computation an optimal strategy σ∗Min for Min. Let k be
the integer such that Val6k+1 = Val6k. For every step ` 6 k of the fixpoint computation, we define a strategy
σ`Min. For every finite play pi ending in a vertex v of Min, if the length of pi is i < `, we let
σ`Min(pi) = argmin
v′∈E(v)
(
ω(v, v′) + Val6`−i−1(v′)
)
,
and otherwise, we let
σ`Min(pi) = argmin
v′∈E(v)
(
ω(v, v′) + Val60(v′)
)
.
Notice that the argmin operator may select any possible vertex as long as it selects one with minimum value.
We also let σ`Min = σkMin for every ` > k, as well as σ∗Min = σkMin. Notice that σ∗Min is a finite-memory strategy,
since it only requires to know the last vertex and the length of the prefix up to k.
We now prove that Val(v, σ∗Min) = supσMax MCR(Play(v, σMax, σ∗Min)) 6 Val
6(v) for all vertices v, which proves
that σ∗Min is an optimal strategy since Val
6(v) = Val(v) by Lemma 10. To do so, we first show by induction on `
that
MCR6`(Play(v, σMax, σ`Min)) 6 Val
6`(v) (2)
holds for every strategy σMax of Max and v ∈ V . This permits to conclude since, from σ∗Min = σ`Min for every
` > k, we can deduce:
lim
`→∞
sup
σMax
MCR6`(Play(v, σMax, σ`Min)) = lim
`→∞
sup
σMax
MCR6`(Play(v, σMax, σ∗Min))
= sup
σMax
MCR(Play(v, σMax, σ∗Min))
and Val6i is a stationary sequence converging towards Val6. The proof by induction goes as follows. In case
` = 0, either v = t and both terms of (2) are equal to 0, or v 6= t and both terms of (2) are equal to +∞.
Supposing now that the property holds for an index `, let us prove it for `+ 1. For that, we consider a strategy
σMax of Max. In case v = t, we have
MCR6`(Play(v, σMax, σ`Min)) = 0 = Val
6`(v) .
We now consider the case v 6= t. Let v′ be the second vertex in Play(v, σMax, σ`+1Min ). From the definition of σ`+1Min ,
Play(v, σMax, σ`+1Min )[`+ 1] is the concatenation of v and Play(v′, σMax, σ`Min)[`]. Hence,
MCR6`+1(Play(v, σMax, σ`+1Min )) = ω(v, v′) +MCR
6`(Play(v′, σMax, σ`Min)) .
By induction hypothesis, we obtain that
MCR6`+1(Play(v, σMax, σ`+1Min )) 6 ω(v, v′) + Val
6`(v′) . (3)
Now, consider the two following cases.
If v ∈ VMin \ {t}, we have v′ = σ`+1Min (v), so that, in case `+ 1 6 k:
ω(v, v′) + Val6`(v′) 6 min
v′′∈V |(v,v′′)∈E
(
ω(v, v′′) + Val6`(v′′)
)
.
Using (3) and Lemma 6, we obtain
MCR6`+1(Play(v, σMax, σ`+1Min )) 6 Val
6`+1(v) .
In case `+ 1 > k, we indeed have Val6` = Val6`+1 = Val6k, so that we conclude similarly.
If v ∈ VMax \ {t}, we have v′ = σMax(v) and
ω(v, v′) + Val6`(v′) 6 max
v′′∈V |(v,v′′)∈E
(
ω(v, v′′) + Val6`(v′′)
)
.
Once again using (3) and Lemma 6, we obtain
MCR6`+1(Play(v, σMax, σ`+1Min )) 6 Val
6`+1(v) .
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This concludes the induction proof. J
Notice that the proof of Proposition 13 together with the statement of Lemma 9 imply that a memory of
size pseudo-polynomial for the strategy of Min is sufficient. Before stating the result for Max, we informally
refine this result in order to find a strategy of Min having more structural properties. It will be composed of two
memoryless strategies σ1Min and σ2Min: the game will start with Min following σ1Min, and at some point, determined
by the weight of the current finite play, Min will switch to strategy σ2Min which is an attractor strategy, i.e., a
strategy that reaches the target in less than |V | steps, regardless of the weights along this path. Intuitively the
strategy σ1Min ensures either to reach the target with optimal value, or to go in cycles of negative weights. The
only chance for Min of having a greater value than the optimal is to go infinitely through these cycles without
reaching the target. But if it does so, the total-payoff will decrease and at some point the value will be so low,
that the cost of calling the attractor strategy will leave the total-payoff smaller than the optimal value. Let us
formalise this construction.
For the sake of exposure, we present the construction when all values are finite, but such construction can
be applied with few changes when some vertices have value −∞ or +∞. We start by defining a memoryless
strategy σ1Min that has some good properties (stated in Proposition 15). Let Xi denote the value of variable X
after i iteration of the loop of Algorithm 1, and let X0(v) = +∞ for all v ∈ V . We have seen that the sequence
X0 < X1 < X2 < · · · is stationary at some point, equal to Val. For all vertices v ∈ VMax \ {t}, let iv > 0 be the
first index such that Xi(v) = Val(v). Fix a vertex v′ 6= t such that Xi(v) = ω(v, v′) +Xi−1(v′) (that exists by
definition) and define σ1Min(v) = v′. The following lemma states that the vertex v′ already reached its final value
at step i− 1.
I Lemma 14. For all vertices v ∈ VMin \ {t}, Xi−1(σ1Min(v)) = Val(σ1Min(v)).
Proof. Let v′ = σ1Min(v). By contradiction assume that Xi−1(v′) > Val(v′), Note that there exists j > i such
that Xj−1(v′) = Val(v′). By definition,
Val(v) 6 Xj(v) 6 ω(v, v′) +Xj−1(v′) = ω(v, v′) + Val(v′)
< ω(v, v′) + Xi−1(v′) = Xi(v) = Val(v),
which raises a contradiction. J
We can state the properties of σ1Min: intuitively one can see it as an almost perfect strategy, in the sense that
it is memoryless, if it reaches the target, then the value obtained is optimal, and if it does not reach the target
then the total-payoff of the finite play will decrease as the game goes on. The only problem is one cannot ensure
that we reach the target.
I Proposition 15. For all vertices v, and for all plays pi = v1v2 · · · starting in v and conforming to σ1Min,
(1) if there exists i < j such that vi = vj , then TP(vi · · · vj) < 0,
(2) if pi reaches t then TP(pi) 6 Val(v).
Proof. Let us prove (1), take a cycle vi · · · vj with vj = vi. Notice that at least one vertex of this cycle belongs
to Min, since, otherwise, Max would have a strategy to obtain a value +∞ for vertex v1, which contradicts the
hypothesis on the game. Hence, for the sake of the explanation, we suppose that vi ∈ VMin. Let us also suppose
that iv0 is maximal among {iv` | i 6 ` < j, vi′ ∈ VMax}. The following extends straightforwardly to the case
where this maximal vertex of Min is not vi. We prove by induction over i < ` 6 j that
Xivi (vi) > TP(vi · · · v`) +Xivi−1(v`) .
The base case comes from the fact that since vi ∈ VMin we have σ1Min(vi) = vi+1 thus Xiv0 = ω(vi, vi+1) +
Xiv0−1(vi+1). For the inductive case, let us consider i < ` < j such that Xivi (vi) > TP(vi · · · v`) +Xivi−1(v`)
and let us prove it for `+ 1.
If v` ∈ VMin, by definition of Xivi , we have
Xiv0 (v`) = max
(v`,v′)∈E
ω(v`, v′) +Xiv0−1(v′) > ω(v`, v`+1) +Xiv0−1(v`+1) .
In case vj ∈ VMin, by maximality of iv0 , we have
Xiv0 (v`) = Xiv` (v`) = ω(v`, v`+1) +Xiv`−1(v`+1)
> ω(v`, v`+1) +Xiv0−1(v`+1)
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using that the sequence X0, X1, X2, . . . is non-increasing.
Hence, in all cases, we have
Xiv0 (v`) > ω(v`, v`+1) +Xiv0−1(v`+1)
Using again that X0, X1, X2, . . . is non-decreasing, we obtain
Xiv0−1(v`) > Xiv0 (v`) > ω(v`, v`+1) +Xiv0−1(v`+1) .
Injecting this into the induction hypothesis, we have
Xiv0 (vi) > TP(vi · · · v`) + ω(v`, v`+1) +Xiv0−1(v`+1)
= TP(vi · · · v`+1) +Xiv0−1(v`+1)
which concludes the proof by induction. In particular, for ` = j, as vi = vj we obtain that
Xiv0 (vi) > Xiv0−1(vi) +TP(vi · · · vj) .
and as, by definition of iv0 , we have Xiv0 (vi) < Xiv0−1(vi), we necessarily have TP(v1 · · · vj) < 0.
To prove (2) we decompose pi as pi = v1 · · · vktω with for all i, vi 6= t. We prove by decreasing induction
on i that TP(vi · · · vktω) 6 Val(v). If i = k + 1, TP(tω) = 0 = Val(t). If i 6 k, by induction we have
TP(vi+1 · · · vktω) = Val(vi+1) thus TP(vi · · · vktω) = ω(vi, vi+1) + Val(vi+1). If vi ∈ VMin then vi+1 = σ?Min(v)
and Val(vi) = ω(vi, vi+1) + Val(vi+1) = TP(vi · · · vktω). If vi ∈ VMax, then TP(vi · · · vktω) = ω(vi, vi+1) +
Val(vi+1) 6 max(vi,v′)∈E ω(vi, vi+1) + Val(vi+1) = Val(vi). J
Next, let σ2Min be the memoryless strategy induced by the computation of the attractor: notice that it is
possible to construct it directly from the value iteration computation by mapping a vertex v to one vertex from
which v is first discovered (i.e., its value is first set to a real value different from +∞). This strategy ensures to
reach the target after at most |V | steps, thus for all v, Val(v, σ2Min) 6W (|V | − 1).
Before defining the strategy σ˜Min, we introduce the notion of switchable finite play as follows. A finite
play v1 · · · vk is switchable if vk ∈ VMax and TP(v1 · · · vk) 6 Val(v1) − Val(vk, σ2Min). Intuitively a strategy is
switchable, if by switching to the attractor strategy, we ensures to get an optimal value.
We define the strategy σ′Min as follows: for all finite play v1 · · · vk with vk ∈ VMax:
σ′Min(v1 · · · vk) =
{
σ2Min(vk) if v1 · · · vi is switchable for some i
σ1Min(vk) otherwise
One can easily show that for all play v1v2 · · · that conforms to σ′Min either v1v2 · · · conforms to σ1Min if no
finite play is switchable, or there exists k such that v1 · · · vk conforms to σ1Min, v1 · · · vk is a switchable finite play,
and vkvk+1 · · · conforms to σ2Min. The following proposition states that the strategy σ′Min is optimal.
I Proposition 16. For all v, Val(v, σ′Min) = Val(v).
Proof. Let v ∈ V and pi = v1v2 · · · ∈ Play(v, σ′Min), let us show that MCR(pi) 6 Val(v). Assume first that
there exists k such that v1 · · · vk conforms to σ1Min, v1 · · · vk is a switchable finite play, and vkvk+1 · · · conforms
to σ2Min. Thus pi reaches the target as vkvk+1 · · · does, and MCR(pi) = TP(v1 · · · vk) +MCR(vkvk+1 · · · ).
As v1 · · · vk is a switchable finite play, we have TP(v1 · · · vk) 6 Val(v1) − Val(vk, σ2Min), thus MCR(pi) 6
Val(v1)− Val(vk, σ2Min) +MCR(vkvk+1 · · · ) 6 Val(v1).
Assume now that v1v2 · · · does not contains a switchable prefix and thus pi conforms to σ1Min. If pi reaches t
then by Proposition 15, MCR(pi) 6 Val(v). To conclude, let us prove that pi reaches t, and by contradiction
assume that this is not the case.
First we prove by induction on k, that (?) for all play v′1 · · · v′k that conforms to σ1Min and does not reach t,
TP(v1 · · · vk) 6 (|V | − 1)W −
⌊
k
|V |
⌋
.
If k < |V | the results is straightforward. For the inductive case, let k > |V | and v′1 · · · v′k that conforms to
σ1Min and does not reach t. Then as k > |V |, there exists i < j such that vi = vj . Thus as v′1 · · · v′iv′j+1 · · · v′k
is a play of size k − |V | that conforms to σ1Min and does not reach t, we know by induction hypothesis that
TP(v′1 · · · v′iv′j+1 · · · v′k) 6 (|V | − 1)W −
⌊
k−|V |
|V |
⌋
= (|V | − 1)W −
⌊
k
|V |
⌋
+ 1. Furthermore by Proposition 15, we
have that TP(v′i · · · v′j) 6 −1. Thus
TP(v′1 · · · v′k) = TP(v′1 · · · v′i) +TP(v′i · · · v′j) +TP(v′j · · · v′k)
= TP(v′1 · · · v′iv′j+1 · · · v′k) + TP(v′1 · · · v′j) 6 (|V | − 1)W −
⌊
k
|V |
⌋
,
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which concludes the proof of (?).
Now we can get back to raising a contradiction, and for that we show that there exists a switchable finite
play in v1v2 · · · . Take k be the least index greater that 3|V |(|V | − 1)W such that vk ∈ VMax (we know that there
exists one, otherwise the vertices vj with j > 3|V |(|V | − 1)W would not be in the attractor of t). We have
TP(v1 · · · vk) 6 (|V | − 1)W −
⌊
k
|V |
⌋
6 −2(|V | − 1)W 6 Val(v1) + Val(vk, σ2Min).
Thus v1 · · · vk is a switchable prefix, which raises a contradiction. J
Notice that σ′Min may be more easily implementable than a more general finite-memory strategy, in particular,
we may encode the current total-payoff in binary, hence saving some space. We give in Algorithm 3 a way to
compute strategies σ1Min and σ2Min.
F.2 Strategies of Max
While we have already shown that optimal strategies for Min might require memory, let us show that Max always
has a memoryless optimal strategy. This asymmetry stems directly from the asymmetric definition of the game –
while Min has the double objective of reaching t and minimising its cost, Max aims at avoiding t, and if not
possible, maximising the cost.
I Proposition 17. In all min-cost reachability game, Max has a memoryless optimal strategy.
Proof. For vertices with value +∞, we already know a memoryless optimal strategy for Max, namely any
strategy that remains outside the attractor of the target vertices. For vertices with value −∞, all strategies are
equally bad for Max.
We now explain how to define a memoryless optimal strategy σ∗Max for Max in case of a graph containing
only finite values. For every finite play pi ending in a vertex v ∈ VMax of Max, we let
σ∗Max(pi) = argmax
v′∈E(v)
(
ω(v, v′) + Val(v′)
)
.
This is clearly a memoryless strategy. Let us prove that it is optimal for Max, that is, for every vertex v ∈ V ,
and every strategy σMin of Min
MCR(Play(v, σ∗Max, σMin)) > Val(v) .
In case Play(v, σ∗Max, σMin) does not reach the target set of vertices, the inequality holds trivially. Otherwise, we
let Play(v, σ∗Max, σMin) = v0v1 · · · v` · · · with ` the least position such that v` = t. If ` = 0, i.e., v = v0 = t, we
have
MCR(Play(v, σ∗Max, σMin)) = 0 = Val(v) .
Otherwise, let us prove by induction on 0 6 i 6 ` that
MCR(v`−i · · · v`) > Val(v`−i) .
This will permit to conclude since
MCR(Play(v, σ∗Max, σMin)) =MCR(v0v1 · · · v`) > Val(v0) = Val(v) .
The base case i = 0 corresponds to the previous case where the starting vertex is t. Supposing that the property
holds for index i, let us prove it for i+ 1. We have
MCR(v`−i−1 · · · v`) = ω(v`−i−1, v`−i) +MCR(v`−i · · · v`) .
By induction hypothesis, we have
MCR(v`−i−1 · · · v`) > ω(v`−i−1, v`−i) + Val(v`−i) . (4)
We now consider two cases:
If v`−i−1 ∈ VMax \ {t}, then v`−i = σ∗Max(v0v1 · · · v`−i−1), so that by definition of σ∗Max:
ω(v`−i−1, v`−i) + Val(v`−i) = max
v′∈V |(v`−i−1,v′)∈E
(
ω(v`−i−1, v′) + Val(v′)
)
.
Using Corollary 11 and (4), we obtain
MCR(v`−i−1 · · · v`) > Val(v`−i−1) .
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If v`−i−1 ∈ VMin \ {t}, then
ω(v`−i−1, v`−i) + Val(v`−i) > min
v′∈V |(v`−i−1,v′)∈E
(
ω(v`−i−1, v′) + Val(v′)
)
.
Once again using Corollary 11 and (4), we obtain
MCR(v`−i−1 · · · v`) > Val(v`−i−1) .
This concludes the proof. J
This strategy σ?Max can directly be computed along the execution of the value iteration algorithm. This is
done in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: Computation of optimal strategy for both players in value iteration algorithm for min-cost
reachability games
Input: min-cost reachability game 〈V,E, ω,MCR〉, W greatest weight in absolute value in the arena
1 X(t) := 0
2 foreach v ∈ V \ {t} do X(v) := +∞
3 repeat
4 Xpre := X
5 foreach v ∈ VMax \ {t} do
6 X(v) := maxv′∈E(v)
(
ω(v, v′) + Xpre(v′)
)
7 if X(v) 6= Xpre(v) then σ∗Max(v) := argmaxv′∈E(v)
(
ω(v, v′) + Xpre(v′)
)
8 foreach v ∈ VMin \ {t} do
9 X(v) := minv′∈E(v)
(
ω(v, v′) + Xpre(v′)
)
10 if X(v) 6= Xpre(v) then
11 σ1Min(v) := argmaxv′∈E(v)
(
ω(v, v′) + Xpre(v′)
)
12 if Xpre(v) = +∞ then σ2Min(v) = σ1Min(v)
13 foreach v ∈ V \ {t} do
14 if X(v) < −(|V | − 1)W then X(v) := −∞
15 until X = Xpre
16 return X
G Reduction of total-payoff games to min-cost reachability games
This section is devoted to the proof of Proposition 2.
For that purpose, we must relate paths in games G and Gn: with each finite path in Gn, we associate a
finite path in G, obtained by looking at the sequence of vertices of V appearing inside the vertices of the finite
play. Formally, the projection of a finite path pi is the sequence proj(pi) of vertices of G inductively defined by
proj(ε) = ε and for all finite path pi, v ∈ V and 1 6 j 6 n:
proj((in, v, j)pi) = proj(pi) , proj((ex, v, j)tpi) = v , proj((ex, v, j)) = ε ,
proj((ex, v, j + 1)(v, j)pi) = proj((v, j)pi) = v proj(pi) .
In particular, notice that in the case of a play with prefix (ex, v, j)t, the rest of the play is entirely composed of
target vertices t, since t is a sink state. For instance, the projection of the finite play
(v1, 3)(in, v2, 3)(ex, v2, 3)(v2, 2)(in, v3, 2)(v3, 2)(in, v3, 2)(ex, v3, 2)t
of the game G3 of Fig. 3 is given by v1v2v3v3.
The following lemma relates plays of Gn with their projection in G, comparing their total-payoff.
I Lemma 18. The projection mapping satisfies the following properties.
1. If pi is a finite play in Gn then proj(pi) is a finite play in G.
2. If pi is a play in Gn that does not reach the target, then proj(pi) is a play in G.
3. For all finite play pi, TP(pi) = TP(proj(pi)).
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Proof. The proof of 2 is a direct consequence of 1. To each vertex w ∈ V n \ {t}, we associate a vertex f(w) as
follows:
f(v, j) = f(in, v, j) = f(ex, v, j) = v .
Then notice that if (w,w′) ∈ En with w,w′ 6= t, then either f(w) = f(w′) or (f(w), f(w′)) ∈ E. We now prove
1 and 3 inductively on the size of the finite play pi = w1 · · ·wk of Gn, along with the fact that
4. if proj(pi) 6= ∅ and w1 6= t then the first vertex of proj(pi) is f(w1).
If k = 0, then pi = proj(pi) = ε are finite plays with the same total-payoff. If k = 1, either proj(pi) = ε or pi = (v, j)
and proj(pi) = v: in both cases, the properties hold trivially. Otherwise, k > 2 and we distinguish several possible
prefixes:
If pi = (in, v, j)pi′, then proj(pi) = proj(pi′). Hence, 1 holds by induction hypothesis. If proj(pi) is non-empty,
so is proj(pi′). Moreover, the first vertex of pi′ is either (v, j) or (ex, v, j), so that we can show 4 by induction
hypothesis. Finally, the previous remark shows that the first edge of pi has necessarily weight 0, so that,
TP(pi) = TP(pi′), and 3 also holds by induction hypothesis.
If pi = (v, j)pi′, then proj(pi) = v proj(pi′) so that 4 holds directly. Moreover, pi′ is a non-empty finite
play so that pi′ = (in, v′, j)pi′′ with (v, v′) ∈ E, and proj(pi′) = proj(pi′′). By induction, proj(pi′) is a
finite play in A, and it starts with v′ (by 4). Since (v, v′) ∈ E, this shows that proj(pi) is a finite play.
Moreover, TP(pi) = ωn((v, j), (in, v′, j)) +TP(pi′) = ω(v, v′) +TP(pi′). By induction hypothesis, we have
TP(pi′) =MCR(proj(pi′)). Moreover,MCR(proj(pi)) = ω(v, v′)+MCR(proj(pi′)) which concludes the proof
of 3.
If pi = (ex, v, j)(v, j − 1)pi′ then proj(pi) = v proj(pi′) = proj((v, j − 1)pi′): this allows us to conclude directly
by using the previous case.
Otherwise, pi = (ex, v, j)tpi′, and then proj(pi) = v is a finite play with total-payoff 0, like pi, and 4 holds
trivially.
J
The next lemma states that when playing memoryless strategies, one can bound the total-payoff of all finite
plays.
I Lemma 19. Let v ∈ V , and σMax (respectively, σMin) be a memoryless strategy for Max (respectively, Min) in
the total-payoff game G, such that Val(v, σMax) 6= −∞ (respectively, Val(v, σMin) 6= +∞). Then for all finite play
pi conforming to σMax (respectively, to σMin), TP(pi) > −(|V | − 1)W (respectively, TP(pi) 6 (|V | − 1)W ).
Proof. We prove the part for Min, the other case is similar. The proof proceeds by induction on the size of a
partial play pi = v1 · · · vk with v1 = v. If k 6 |V | then TP(pi) =
∑k−1
i=1 ω(vi, vi+1) 6 (k − 1)W 6 (|V | − 1)W . If
k > |V |+ 1 then there exists i < j such that vi = vj . Assume by contradiction that TP(vi · · · vj) > 0. Then
the play pi′ = v1 · · · vi · · · vj(vi+1 · · · vj)ω conforms to σMin and TP(pi′) = +∞ which contradicts Val(v, σMin) 6=
+∞. Therefore TP(vi · · · vj) 6 0. We have TP(pi) = TP(v1 · · · vi) + TP(vi · · · vj) + TP(vj+1 · · · vk), and
since vi = vj , v1 · · · vivj+1 · · · vk is a finite play starting from v that conforms to σMin, and by induction
hypothesis TP(v1 · · · vivj+1 · · · vk) 6 (|V | − 1)W . Then TP(pi) = TP(v1 · · · vivj+1 · · · vk) + TP(vi · · · vj) 6
TP(v1 · · · vivj+1 · · · vk) 6 (|V | − 1)W . J
This permits to bound the finite values Val(v) of vertices v of the game:
I Corollary 20. For all v ∈ V , Val(v) ∈ [− (|V | − 1)W, (|V | − 1)W ] unionmulti {−∞,+∞}.
Proof. From [10], we know that total-payoff games are positionally determined, i.e., there exists two memoryless
strategies σMax, σMin such that for all v, Val(v) = Val(v, σMax) = Val(v, σMin). Assume that Val(v) /∈ {−∞,+∞}.
Then since Val(v, σMin) = Val(v) 6= −∞, Lemma 19 shows that all finite play pi that conforms to σMin verifies
TP(pi) > −(|V | − 1)W , therefore Val(v) > −(|V | − 1)W . One can similarly prove that TP(v) 6 (|V | − 1)W . J
We now compare values in both games. A first lemma shows, in particular, that ValGn(v, n) 6 ValG(v), in
case ValG(v) 6= +∞.
I Lemma 21. For all m ∈ Z, v ∈ V , and n > 1, if ValG(v) 6 m then ValGn(v, n) 6 m.
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Proof. By hypothesis and using the memoryless determinacy of [10], there exists a memoryless strategy σMin for
Min in G such that ValG(v, σMin) 6 m. Let σmMin be the strategy in Gn defined, for all finite play pi, vertex v′ and
1 6 j 6 n, by
σmMin(pi(v′, j)) = (in, σMin(proj(pi)v′), j) ,
σmMin(pi(in, v′, j)) =
{
(v′, j) if TP(pi(in, v′, j)) > m+ 1 ,
(ex, v′, j) if TP(pi(in, v′, j)) 6 m.
Intuitively σmMin simulates σMin, and asks to leave the copy when the current total-payoff is less than or equal to
m. Notice that, by construction of σmMin, proj(pi) conforms to σMin, if pi conforms to σmMin.
As a first step, if a play pi starting in (v, n) and conforming to σmMin encounters the target then its value is at
most m. Indeed, it is of the form pi = pi′(in, v′, j)(ex, v′, j)tω, and since it conforms to σmMin we have
MCR(pi) = TP(pi′(in, v′, j)(ex, v′, j)t) = TP(pi′(in, v′, j)) 6 m.
Then, assume, by contradiction, that there exists a play pi starting in (v, n) and conforming to σmMin, that
does not encounter the target. Then, this means that Min does not ask n+ 1 times the ability to exit in pi (since
on the (n+ 1)th time that we jump in an exterior vertex, Max is forced to go to the target). In particular, there
exists 0 6 j 6 n such that pi is of the form pi′(v1, j)(in, v2, j)(v2, j)(in, v3, j) · · · (vk, j)(in, vk, j) · · · . Since for
all i, σmMin(pi′(v1, j)(in, v2, j) · · · (in, vi, j)) = (vi, j), we have that TP(pi′(v1, j)(in, v2, j) · · · (in, vi, j)) > m+ 1.
Therefore, since any prefix of proj(pi) is the projection of a prefix of pi, Lemma 18 shows that TP(proj(pi)) >
m+1 > m, which raises a contradiction since proj(pi) conforms to σMin and Val(v, σMin) 6 m. Hence every play that
conforms to σmMin encounters the target, and, hence, has value at most m. This implies that ValGn(v, n) 6 m. J
We now turn to the other comparison between ValGn(v, n) and ValG(v). Since ValG(v) can be infinite
in case the target is not reachable, we have to be more careful. In particular, we show that ValGn(v, n) >
min
(
ValG(v), (|V | − 1)W + 1
)
holds for large values of n. In the following, we let K = |V |(2(|V | − 1)W + 1).
I Lemma 22. For all m 6 (|V | − 1)W + 1, k > K, and vertex v, if ValG(v) > m then ValGk(v, k) > m.
Proof. By hypothesis and using the memoryless determinacy of [10], there exists a memoryless strategy σMax for
Max in G such that ValG(v, σMax) > m. Let σmMax be the strategy in GK defined, for all finite play pi, vertex v′
and 1 6 j 6 n, by:
σmMax(pi(v, j)) = (in, σMax(proj(pi)v), j) ,
σmMax(pi(ex, v, j)) =
{
(v, j − 1) if TP(pi) 6 m− 1 and j > 1 ,
t otherwise .
Intuitively σmMax simulates σMax, and accepts to go to the target when the current total-payoff is greater than
or equal to m.
By construction of σmMax, if pi conforms to σmMax, then proj(pi) conforms to σMax. From the structure of
the weighted graph, we know that for every play pi of Gk, there exists 1 6 j 6 k such that pi is of the form
pik(ex, vk, k)pik−1(ex, vk−1, k− 1) · · ·pij(ex, vj , j)pi′ verifying that: there are no occurrences of exterior vertices in
pik, . . . , pij , pi
′; for all ` 6 j, all vertices in pi` belong to the `-th copy of G; either pi′ = tω or all vertices of pi′
belong to the (j + 1)th copy of G (in which case, j < k).
We now show that, in Gk, MCR(pi) > m for all play pi starting in (v, k) and conforming to σmMax. There are
three cases to consider.
1. If pi does not reach the target, then MCR(pi) = +∞ > m.
2. If pi = pik(ex, vk, k) · · ·pij(ex, vj , j)tω and j > 1 then,
σmMax(pik(ex, v0, k) · · ·pij(ex, vj , j)) = t .
Thus, using Lemma 18,
MCR(pi) = TP(pik(ex, vk, k) · · ·pij(ex, vj , j)t)
= TP(proj(pik(ex, vk, k) · · ·pij(ex, vj , j)t))
> ValG(v, σMax) > m.
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3. If pi = pik(ex, vk, k) · · ·pi1(ex, v1, 1)tω, assume by contradiction that
TP(pik(ex, vk, k) · · ·pi1) 6 m− 1 .
Otherwise, we directly obtain MCR(pi) > m. Let v? be a vertex that occurs at least N = dK/|V |e =
2(|V | − 1)W + 1 times in the sequence v1, . . . , vk: such a vertex exists, since otherwise K 6 k 6 (N − 1)|V |
which contradicts the fact that (N −1)|V | < K. Let j1 > · · · > jN be a sequence of indices such that vji = v?
for all i. We give a new decomposition of pi:
pi = pi′1(ex, vj1 , j1) · · ·pi′N (ex, vjN , jN )pi′N+1 .
Since pi conforms to σmMax and according to the assumption, we have that for all i,
TP(pi′1(ex, vj1 , j1) · · ·pi′i) 6 m− 1 .
We consider two cases.
a. If there exists pi′i such that TP(pi′i) 6 0 then, let proj(pi′i) = u1 · · ·u` with u1 = u` = v?, Since pi′i conforms
to σmMax, proj(pi′i) conforms to σMax. Therefore the play
pi = proj(pi′1(ex, vj1 , j1) · · ·pi′i(ex, vji , ji))(u1 · · ·u`−1)ω
conforms to σMax. Furthermore, using again Lemma 18,
TP(pi) = lim inf
n→+∞
(
TP
(
pi′1(ex, vj1 , i1) · · ·pi′i(ex, vji , ji)
)
+ nTP(u1 · · ·u`)
)
and since TP(u1 · · ·u`) = TP(pi′i) 6 0, we have
TP(pi) 6 TP(pi′1(ex, vj1 , i1) · · ·pi′i(ex, vji , ji)) 6 m− 1.
Thus pi is a play starting from v that conforms to σMax but whose total-payoff is strictly less than m,
which raises a contradiction.
b. If for all pi′i, TP(pi′i) > 1 (notice that it is implied by TP(pi′i) > 0). From Lemma 19, since ValG(v, σMax) >
m 6= −∞, we know that TP(proj(pi′0)) > −(|V | − 1)W . From Lemma 18, TP(pi′0) > −(|V | − 1)W .
Therefore
TP(pi′1(ex, vj1 , i1) · · ·pi′N ) > −(|V | − 1)W +N
= (|V | − 1)W + 1 > m
which contradicts the assumption that
TP(pi′1(ex, vj1 , i1) · · ·pi′N ) < m.
We have shown that MCR(pi) > m for all play pi starting in (v, k) and conforming to σmMax, which implies
ValGK ((v, k), σmMax) > m. J
From the two previous lemmas, we are ready to relate precisely values in G and Gk.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let v ∈ V .
If ValG(v) = −∞, then for all m, ValG(v) 6 m. Thus, by Lemma 21, ValGK ((v,K)) 6 m. Therefore
ValGK (v,K) = −∞.
If ValG(v) = m ∈ [−(|V | − 1)W, (|V | − 1)W ]. Then, m 6 ValG(v) > m. Thus, by Lemma 21 and 22,
m 6 ValGK ((v,K)) > m. Therefore ValGK ((v,K)) = m.
If ValG(v) = +∞, then ValG(v) > (|V | − 1)W + 1. Thus, by Lemma 22, ValGK ((v,K)) > (|V | − 1)W + 1.
J
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H Value iteration algorithm for total-payoff games
This section is devoted to the study of Algorithm 2, in particular in the proof of Theorem 3.
We first define formally the game GY described informally on page 11. To the original total-payoff
game G = 〈V,E, ω,TP〉 and to every vector Y ∈ ZV∞, we associate the min-cost reachability game GY =
〈V ′, EY , ωY , {t}-MCR〉 as follows. The sets of vertices are given by
V ′Max = VMax unionmulti {(in, v) | v ∈ V } unionmulti {t} and V ′Min = VMin .
As in game Gj , vertices of the form (in, v) are called interior vertices. Edges are defined by
EY =
{(
(v, (in, v′)
) | (v, v′) ∈ E} unionmulti {((in, v), v) | v ∈ V }
unionmulti {((in, v), t) | v ∈ V ∧ Y (v) 6= +∞} unionmulti {(t, t)}
while weights of edges are defined, for all (v, v′) ∈ E, by
ωY
(
v, (in, v′)
)
= ωY (v, v′) , ωY
(
(in, v), t
)
= max
(
0, Y (v)
)
,
ωY
(
(in, v), v
)
= 0.
It is easy to see that lines 3 to 10 are a rewriting of Algorithm 1 in the special case of game GY : in particular,
neither the target vertex nor interior vertices are explicit, but their behavior is taken into account by the
transformation performed in line 3 and the operators min used in the inner computation of lines 6 and 7. Hence,
if we define H(Y )(v) = ValGY (v) for all v ∈ V , we can say that if inside the main loop, at line 3 the variable Y
has value Y , then after line 10, it has value H(Y ).
Notice that the game GY resembles a copy of G in the game Gj of the previous section. More, precisely, from
the values (ValGj (v, j))v∈V in the jth copy, we can deduce the values in the (j + 1)th copy by an application of
operator H:(
ValGj+1(v, j + 1)
)
v∈V = H
(
(ValGj (v, j))v∈V
)
.
Although the 0th copy is not defined, we abuse the notation and set ValG0(v, 0) = −∞, which still conforms to
the above equality. Furthermore, due to the structure of the game Gj notice that for all j 6 j′, ValGj (v, j) =
ValGj′ (v, j).
Notice the absence of exterior vertices (ex, v′, j) in game GY , replaced by the computation of the maximum
between 0 and X(v′) on the edge towards the target. Before proving the correctness of Algorithm 2, we prove
several interesting properties of operator H.
I Proposition 23. H is a monotonic operator.
Proof. For every vector Y ∈ ZV∞, let FY be the operator associated with the min-cost reachability game as
defined in Section 3, i.e., for all X ∈ ZV ′∞ , and for all v1 ∈ V ′
FY (X)(v1) =

max
v2∈EY (v1)
(
ωY (v1, v2) +X(v2)
)
if v ∈ V ′Max \ {t}
min
v2∈EY (v1)
(
ωY (v1, v2) +X(v2)
)
if v ∈ VMin
0 if v1 = t .
We know from Corollary 11 that ValGY is the greatest fixed point of FY . Consider now two vectors Y, Y ′ ∈ ZV∞
such that Y 4 Y ′.
First, notice that for all X ∈ ZV ′∞ :
FY (X) 4 FY ′(X) . (5)
Indeed, to get the result it suffices to notice that for all v1, v2 ∈ V ′, ωY (v1, v2) 6 ωY ′(v1, v2).
Consider then the vector X0 defined by X0(v1) = +∞ for all v1 ∈ V ′. From (5), we have that FY (X0) 4
FY ′(X0), then a simple induction shows that for all i, F iY (X0) 4 F iY ′(X0). Thus, since ValGY (respectively,
ValGY ′ ) is the greatest fixed point of FY (respectively, FY ′), we have ValGY 4 ValGY ′ . As a consequence
H(Y ) 4 H(Y ′). J
Notice that H may not be Scott-continuous, as shown in the following example.
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Figure 6 The games G and GY .
I Example 24. Recall that, in our setting, a Scott-continuous operator is a mapping F : ZV∞ → ZV∞ such that
for any sequence of vectors (xi)i>0 having a limit xω, the sequence (F (xi))i>0 has a limit equal to F (xω).
We present a total-payoff game whose associated operator H is not continuous. Let G be the total-payoff
game containing one vertex v of Min and a self loop of weight −1 (as depicted in Fig. 6). For all Y ∈ Z, in the
min-cost reachability game GY , v has value −∞, indeed one can take the loop an arbitrary number of times
before reaching the target, ensuring a value arbitrary low. Therefore, if we take an increasing sequence (Yi)i>0
of integers, H(Yi)(v) = −∞ for all i, thus the limit of the sequence (H(Yi))i>0 is −∞. However, the limit of the
sequence (Yi)i>0 is +∞ and H(+∞)(v) = +∞, since the target is not reachable anymore (in case the weight of
an edge would be +∞, it is removed in the definition of EY ). Thus, H is not Scott-continuous. J
In particular, we may not use the Kleene sequence, as we have done for min-cost reachability games, to
conclude to the correctness of our algorithm. Anyhow, we will show that the sequence (Y j)j>0 indeed converges
towards the vector of values of the total-payoff game. We first show that this vector is a pre-fixed point of H
starting with a technical lemma that is useful in the subsequent proof.
I Lemma 25. Let σMin be a strategy for Min in G, and pi = v1 · · · vi a finite play that conforms to σMin. Then:
TP(v1 · · · vi) + ValG(vi) 6 ValG(v1, σMin) .
Proof. Let σMax be an optimal strategy for Min and vivi+1vi+2 · · · be the play Play(vi, σMax, σMin). Since σMax is
optimal, TP(vivi+1vi+2 · · · ) > ValG(vi). Furthermore notice that v1 · · · vivi+1 · · · conforms to the strategy σMin,
therefore TP(v1v1 · · · vivi+1 · · · ) 6 ValG(v1, σMin). Thus:
TP(v1 · · · vi) + ValG(vi) 6 TP(v1 · · · vi) +TP(vivi+1 · · · )
6 TP(v1v1 · · · vivi+1 · · · ) 6 ValG(v1, σMin) .
J
I Lemma 26. ValG is a pre-fixed point of H, i.e., H(ValG) 4 ValG.
Proof. To ease the notations, we denote ValG by Y ? in this proof. To prove this lemma, we just have to show
that for all v1 ∈ V , the value of v1 in the min-cost reachability game GY ? is at most its value in the original
total-payoff game G, i.e.,
H(Y ?)(v1) = ValGY ? (v1) 6 Y ?(v1) .
Let σMin be a memoryless strategy in G such that ValG(v1, σMin) 6 m for some m ∈ Z unionmulti {+∞}. And let σmMin
be a strategy in GX defined for all finite play piv′ with v′ ∈ VMin by σmMin(piv′) = (in, σMin(v′)) and for all finite
play pi(in, v′),
σmMin(in, v′) =
{
t if TP(pi(in, v′)t) 6 m
v otherwise .
Notice that, by construction, all plays starting in v1, conforming to σmMin and that reach the target have value
at most m. Assume by contradiction that there exists a play v1(in, v2)v2(in, v3) · · · ∈ Play(v1, σmMin) that never
reaches t. In particular, for all i, TP(v1(in, v2) · · · (in, vi)t) > m.
Again by construction, v1v2 · · · is a play in G that conforms to σMin and for all i, TP(v1(in, v2) · · · (in, vi)) =
TP(v1 · · · vi).
If there exists i > 2 such that Y ?(vi) = ValG(vi) > 0, then
TP(v1(in, v2) · · · (in, vi)t) = TP(v1(in, v2) · · · (in, vi)) + ωX((in, vi), t)
= TP(v1 · · · vi) + max(0, Y ?(vi))
= TP(v1 · · · vi) + Y ?(vi)
6 Val(v1, σMin) (from Lemma 25)
6 m
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which raises a contradiction.
If for all i > 2, Y ?(vi) = ValG(vi) < 0 then for all i > 2,
TP(v1(in, v2) · · · (in, vi)t) = TP(v1(in, v2) · · · (in, vi)) = TP(v1 · · · vi) > m .
Thus TP(v1v2 · · · ) > m, which contradicts the fact that v1v2 · · · conforms to σMin and ValG(v1, σMin) 6 m.
Thus ValGY ? (v1, σMin) 6 m. As a consequence, ValGY ? (v1) 6 ValG(v1). J
I Remark. Even if it is not necessary for the proof of Theorem 3, we can show that ValG is the least pre-fixed
point of H. Notice that, by monotonicity of H, this directly implies that ValG is the least fixed point of H.
The proof that ValG is the least pre-fixed point of H amounts to better understand the convergence of the
sequence (ValGj (v, j))j>0 (remember that we set ValG0(v, 0) = −∞ for all v). Indeed, Proposition 2 already
shows that for vertices v such that ValG(v) < +∞, (ValGj (v, j))j>1 converges towards ValG(v). It is also the case
for vertices v such that ValG(v) = +∞ as we show in Lemma 27 below. Then, consider a pre-fixed point Y of H,
i.e., H(Y ) 4 Y . Since ValG0(v, 0) = −∞ 6 Y (v) and H is monotonous, we prove by immediate induction that
ValGj (v, j) 6 Y (v) for all v and j > 0: indeed, if ValGj (v, j) 6 Y (v) for all v, we have
(ValGj+1(v, j + 1))v∈V = H((ValGj (v, j))v∈V ) 4 H(Y ) 4 Y .
This implies that ValG 4 Y , showing that ValG is indeed the least pre-fixed point of H, and hence the least fixed
point of H, by the above reasoning.
Before continuing the proof of Theorem 3, we show the result used in the previous remark.
I Lemma 27. Let v ∈ V such that ValG(v) = +∞, and σMax a memoryless strategy for Max in G such that
ValG(v, σMax) = +∞. Then the following holds:
(i) For every finite play v1 · · · vk conforming to σMax starting in v1 = v, if there exists i < j such that vi = vj
then TP(vi · · · vj) > 1.
(ii) For every m ∈ N, k > m|V | + 1 and v1 · · · vk a finite play conforming to σMax and starting in v1 = v,
TP(v1 · · · vk) > m− (|V | − 1)W .
(iii) For all m ∈ N and k > (m+ (|V | − 1)W )|V |+ 1, ValGk(v, k) > m.
(iv) limj→∞ ValGj (v, j) = +∞.
Proof. We prove (i) by contradiction. Therefore, assume that TP(vi · · · vj) 6 0, then pi = v1 · · · vi−1(vi · · · vj−1)ω
comforms to σMax and TP(pi) 6 TP(v1 · · · vi−1) < +∞, which contradicts the fact that ValG(v, σMax) = +∞.
We prove (ii) by induction on m. The base case is straightforward. For the inductive case, let m > 0,
k > m|V |+ 1 and v1 · · · vk a finite play conforming to σMax and starting in v1 = v. Since k > m|V |+ 1 > |V |+ 1
there exists i < j 6 |V |+ 1 such that vi = vj . Thus:
TP(v1 · · · vk) = TP(v1 · · · vi) +TP(vi · · · vj) +TP(vj · · · vk)
= TP(v1 · · · vivj+1 · · · vk) +TP(vi · · · vj)
> TP(v1 · · · vivj+1 · · · vk) + 1 . from (i)
By induction hypothesis, as v1 · · · vivj+1 · · · vk conforms to σMax and has length at least (m− 1)|V |+ 1 (because
i < j 6 |V | + 1, implying that j − i 6 |V |), we have TP(v1 · · · vivj+1 · · · vk) > m − 1 − (|V | − 1)W , thus
TP(v1 · · · vk) > m− (|V | − 1)W .
To prove (iii), let σ′Max be a strategy of Max in Gk defined by σ′Max(v, j) = (in, σMax(v), j) and σ′Max(ex, v, j) =
(v, j − 1) for all v ∈ V and j > k. Let pi be a play starting in (v, k) and conforming to σ′Max. If pi does not
reach t, then MCR(pi) = +∞ > m. If pi reaches the target then proj(pi) is of the form v1 · · · v`tω, with
MCR(pi) = TP(v1 · · · v`). It is clear by construction of σ′Max that v1 · · · v` is a finite play of G that conforms
to σMax. Furthermore, ` > k > (m+ (|V | − 1)W )|V |+ 1 thus, from (ii), we have that TP(v1 · · · v`) > m. This
impliesMCR(pi) > m. Hence, every play in Gk conforming to σ′Max and starting in (v, k) has a value at least m,
which means that ValGk(v, k) > m.
Item (iv) is then a direct consequence of (iii). J
We are now ready to state and prove the inductive invariant allowing us to show the correctness of Algorithm 2.
I Lemma 28. Before the j-th iteration of the external loop of Algorithm 2, we have ValGj (v, j) 6 Y j(v) 6 ValG(v)
for all vertices v ∈ V .
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Proof. For j = 0, we have Y 0(v) = −∞ = ValG0(v, 0) for all vertex v ∈ V . Suppose then that the invariant
holds for j > 0. We know that ValGj+1(v, j + 1) = H((ValGj (v′, j))v′∈V ). Moreover, after the assignment of
line 10, by definition of H, variable Y contains H(Y j). The operation performed on line 11 only increases the
values of vector Y, so that at the end of the jth iteration, we have H(Y j) 4 Y j+1. Since H is monotonous, and
by the invariant at step j, we obtain
ValGj+1(v, j + 1) = H((ValGj (v′, j))v′∈V ) 6 H(Y j) 6 Y j+1 .
Moreover, using again the monotony of H and Lemma 26, we have
H(Y j) 4 H(ValG) 4 ValG .
A closer look at line 11 shows that H(Y j) and Y j+1 coincide over vertices v such that H(Y j)(v) 6 (|V |−1)W , and
otherwise Y j+1(v) = +∞. Hence, if H(Y j)(v) 6 (|V | − 1)W , we directly obtain Y j+1(v) = H(Y j)(v) 6 ValG(v).
Otherwise, we know that ValG(v) > (|V | − 1)W . By Corollary 20, we know that ValG(v) = +∞, so that
Y j+1(v) = +∞ = ValG(v). In the overall, we have proved
ValGj+1(v, j + 1) 6 Y j+1(v) 6 ValG(v) (6)
J
We are now able to prove the correction of the algorithm.
Proof of Theorem 3. For j = K (remember that K was defined in the previous section), the invariant of
Lemma 28 becomes
ValGK (v,K) 6 Y K(v) 6 ValG(v)
for all vertices v ∈ V . Notice that the iteration may have stopped before iteration K, in which case the sequence
(Y j)j>0 may be considered as stationary. In case ValG(v) 6= +∞, Proposition 2 proves that ValGK (v,K) = ValG(v),
so that we have Y K(v) = ValG(v). In case ValG(v) = +∞, Proposition 2 shows that ValGK (v,K) > (|V | − 1)W :
by the operation performed at line 11, we obtain that Y K(v) = +∞ = ValG(v).
Hence, K = |V |(2(|V | − 1)W + 1) is an upper bound on the number of iterations before convergence of
Algorithm 2, and moreover, at the convergence, the algorithm outputs the vector of optimal values of the
total-payoff game. J
I An example of parametric total-payoff game
We depict in Fig. 7 a weighted graph parametrized with the number n of layers, as well as the greatest weight
W > 0. For both the min-cost reachability objective (with t the target) and the total-payoff objectives, the
values of the vertices are as follows: vertices v3k+1 and v3k+2 (k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}) have value 0, whereas vertices
v3k (k ∈ {1, . . . , n}) have value W . In our add-on prototype of PRISM, we model the min-cost objective with
〈〈Max〉〉Rmax=?[F∞t] for Max and 〈〈Min〉〉Rmin=?[F∞t] for Min, whereas total-payoff objectives are modelled by
〈〈Max〉〉Rmax=?[Fc⊥] and 〈〈Min〉〉Rmin=?[Fc⊥].
We present in the following table the time for resolution (in seconds), the number of iterations in the external
loop, and the total number of iterations in the internal loops for the total-payoff resolution, for various values of
parameters W and n:
W\n 100 200 300 400 500
50 0.52 / 151 / 12603 1.90 / 251 / 22703 3.84 / 351 / 32803 6.05 / 451 / 42903 9.83 / 551 / 53003
100 1.00 / 201 / 30103 3.48 / 301 / 50203 8.64 / 401 / 70303 13.53 / 501 / 90403 22.64 / 601 / 110503
150 1.89 / 251 / 52603 6.02 / 351 / 82703 12.88 / 451 / 112803 22.13 / 551 / 142903 34.16 / 651 / 173003
200 2.96 / 301 / 80103 9.62 / 401 / 120203 18.33 / 501 / 160303 30.42 / 601 / 200403 45.64 / 701 / 240503
250 3.92 / 351 / 112603 13.28 / 451 / 162703 25.18 / 551 / 212803 46.23 / 651 / 262903 71.51 / 751 / 313003
Notice that due to the very little memory consumption of the algorithm, there is no risk of running out of
memory. However, the execution time can become very large. For instance, in case W = 500 and n = 1000, the
execution time becomes 536s whereas the total number of iterations in the internal loop is greater than a million.
On this example, with n+ 1 components, the acceleration heuristics presented in details in Appendix J gives
excellent results. Indeed, by combining both heuristics, we obtain the following results:
W\n 100 200 300 400 500
50 0.01 / 402 / 1404 0.08 / 802 / 2804 0.22 / 1202 / 4204 0.38 / 1602 / 5604 0.42 / 2002 / 7004
100 0.02 / 402 / 1404 0.09 / 802 / 2804 0.19 / 1202 / 4204 0.33 / 1602 / 5604 0.40 / 2002 / 7004
150 0.03 / 402 / 1404 0.09 / 802 / 2804 0.18 / 1202 / 4204 0.29 / 1602 / 5604 0.47 / 2002 / 7004
200 0.02 / 402 / 1404 0.07 / 802 / 2804 0.16 / 1202 / 4204 0.23 / 1602 / 5604 0.47 / 2002 / 7004
250 0.01 / 402 / 1404 0.07 / 802 / 2804 0.17 / 1202 / 4204 0.29 / 1602 / 5604 0.48 / 2002 / 7004
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Figure 7 Parametric weighted graph
Notice that the number of iterations in both internal and external loops do no longer depend on the choice of
parameter W , as well as the execution time. With respect to the execution time, the decrease from the case
without acceleration is even larger, since the updates of vector X inside the inner loop need only to be performed
on the vertices of the current component. For large instances, the execution time may again become very large,
but in case W = 500 (as previously said, this value is independent of the result) and n = 1000, it shrinks to 2.3s
whereas the total number of iterations in the internal loop becomes 14004, i.e., 5 orders of magnitude less than
for the algorithm without acceleration heuristics.
J Acceleration heuristics in MCR games
Algorithm 4 and 5 are enhanced versions of Algorithm 1 and 2 respectively, that apply the acceleration heuristics
described at the end of Section 5.
Algorithm 4: Accelerated value iteration algorithm for min-cost reachability games
Input: min-cost reachability game 〈V,E, ω, {t}-MCR〉, SCC-decomposition c : V → {0, 1, . . . , p} and an
oracle O(q, v) outputting sets (Sv)v∈c−1(q)
1 X(t) := 0
2 for q = 1 to p do
3 (Sv)v∈c−1(q) := O(q,X) /* Use of the oracle */
4 foreach v ∈ c−1(q) do X(v) := maxSv
5 repeat
6 Xpre := X
7 foreach v ∈ c−1(q) ∩ VMax do
8 X(v) := maxv′∈E(v)
(
ω(v, v′) + Xpre(v′)
)
9 foreach v ∈ c−1(q) ∩ VMin do
10 X(v) := minv′∈E(v)
(
ω(v, v′) + Xpre(v′)
)
11 foreach v ∈ c−1(q) do X(v) := max (Sv ∩ [−∞,X(v)])
12 until X = Xpre
13 return X
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Algorithm 5: Accelerated value iteration algorithm for total-payoff games
Input: Total-payoff game G = 〈V,E, ω,TP〉, SCC-decomposition c : V → {0, 1, . . . , p} and an oracle
O(q, v) outputting sets (Sv)v∈c−1(q)
1 foreach v ∈ V do Y(v) := −∞
2 for q = 0 to p do
3 (Sv)v∈c−1(q) := O(q,Y) /* Use of the oracle */
4 repeat
5 foreach v ∈ c−1(q) do
6 Ypre(v) := Y(v); Y(v) := max(0,Y(v)); X(v) := maxSv
7 repeat
8 Xpre := X
9 foreach v ∈ VMax ∩ c−1(q) do
10 X(v) := maxv′∈E(v)
[
ω(v, v′) + min(Xpre(v′),Y(v′))
]
11 foreach v ∈ VMin ∩ c−1(q) do
12 X(v) := minv′∈E(v)
[
ω(v, v′) + min(Xpre(v′),Y(v′))
]
13 foreach v ∈ c−1(q) do X(v) := max (Sv ∩ [−∞,X(v)])
14 until X = Xpre
15 Y := X
16 foreach v ∈ V such that Y(v) > (|V | − 1)W do Y(v) := +∞
17 until Y = Ypre
18 return Y
